Tharpe v. Sellers
138 S. Ct. 545
SCOTUS2018Background
- Keith Tharpe was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to death by a Georgia jury; jury deliberations took less than two hours.
- Years after the trial, juror Barney Gattie signed an affidavit saying he held overtly racist views and that Tharpe should “get the electric chair” because of his race; Gattie never retracted that affidavit.
- The State later obtained a second Gattie affidavit and testimony in which Gattie denied voting for death because of race and said he had been drinking when he signed the first affidavit.
- A Georgia state postconviction court rejected Tharpe’s juror‑bias claim (procedural default and no prejudice), crediting Gattie’s later testimony; ten other jurors denied race influenced deliberations.
- Tharpe sought to reopen federal habeas proceedings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) relying on Pena‑Rodriguez (juror racial bias exception to no‑impeachment rules) and Buck; the District Court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit denied a COA, concluding reasonable jurists would not debate lack of prejudice.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Eleventh Circuit judgment, and remanded—holding jurists of reason could debate whether Tharpe had rebutted the state court’s factual finding by clear and convincing evidence based on Gattie’s affidavit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tharpe) | Defendant's Argument (Warden/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tharpe may reopen final federal habeas proceedings under Rule 60(b)(6) based on new law recognizing juror racial bias (Pena‑Rodriguez) | Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted because Pena‑Rodriguez provides an extraordinary circumstance to consider his defaulted race‑based claim | Rule 60(b)(6) is unavailable: Pena‑Rodriguez does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review; relief is not warranted | Court did not decide full Rule 60(b) merits; remanded for further COA consideration (did not foreclose denial) |
| Whether Tharpe’s juror‑bias claim is procedurally defaulted and, if so, whether he showed cause and prejudice to excuse default | Tharpe says new evidence (Gattie affidavit) and new law excuse default and show prejudice | State says claim was defaulted on direct appeal; ineffective assistance arguments fail; state court found no prejudice and its finding is entitled to deference | Supreme Court held jurists of reason could debate prejudice given Gattie’s affidavit; remanded for COA consideration (did not resolve cause) |
| Whether Gattie’s affidavit rebuts the state court’s factual determination that race did not influence his vote (standard: clear and convincing evidence under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1)) | The un‑retracted sworn affidavit is strong direct evidence that Gattie’s racism affected his vote and thus meets the clear‑and‑convincing threshold to dispute the state finding | State points to Gattie’s recantation/second affidavit, testimony about intoxication, and corroborating juror statements; argues deference to state credibility finding bars relief | Court held reasonable jurists could debate whether Tharpe produced clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court’s finding, so the Eleventh Circuit erred to treat that issue as indisputable |
| Whether reasonable jurists could debate the District Court’s discretionary denial of a COA under applicable standards | Tharpe contends the affidavit and intervening Supreme Court decisions make his entitlement to a COA debatable | State argues multiple alternative, non‑debateable grounds supported denial (e.g., nonretroactivity of Pena‑Rodriguez, failure to show cause, deference to credibility findings) | Court vacated Eleventh Circuit and remanded for further consideration of COA; emphasized that although COA may still be denied, prejudice was not indisputable |
Key Cases Cited
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (standard for habeas prejudice inquiry)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief available only in extraordinary circumstances)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity framework for new rules on collateral review)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (deference to trial‑court findings on juror impartiality)
- Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) (state‑court credibility findings on habeas review entitled to deference)
- Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (appellate review of district court discretion under Rule 60(b))