152 So. 3d 714
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- On Nov. 2008, four masked men entered a Delray Beach Dunkin Donuts, forced patrons onto the floor, and one assailant shot three people in the face; all survived with severe injuries.
- Evidence recovered from a townhome included victims’ credit cards and yellow shotgun shells matching those at the scene; occupants identified Bell as present and observed a shotgun taken from under a couch.
- Bell was stopped attempting to board a cruise the day after the search; he gave a recorded statement claiming he joined under threat and that the shooter said, “this time I’m going after lives, I’m claiming bodies.”
- Bell was charged with attempted first‑degree murder (three counts), robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, and related offenses; tried as a principal.
- The trial court instructed the jury on both attempted premeditated murder and attempted felony murder; the jury convicted Bell of two counts of attempted first‑degree murder and multiple robbery/assault/false imprisonment counts.
- Bell appealed, arguing the felony‑murder instruction was improper (not charged) and that the denial of his judgment of acquittal on attempted first‑degree murder was erroneous; the Fourth DCA affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Bell's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on attempted felony murder when the information mentioned only premeditation | Instruction was improper because the information charged premeditated murder and did not expressly charge felony murder | Charging premeditated murder permits prosecution under alternative theories, including felony murder | No error; instruction permissible under controlling precedent |
| Whether the trial court erred in denying Bell’s motion for judgment of acquittal on attempted first‑degree murder counts | Insufficient evidence of intent for attempted premeditated murder or knowledge of shooter’s intent | Bell’s confession, participation, and the shooter’s statements supplied direct evidence of intent or knowledge; jury could infer intent | Denial affirmed; sufficient evidence for both attempted felony murder and attempted premeditated murder |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2005) (charging premeditated murder allows alternative prosecution under felony murder)
- Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995) (same principle permitting felony murder as alternative theory)
- Stanley v. State, 57 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (recognizing Parker/Kearse principle on alternative murder theories)
- Dempsey v. State, 72 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (applies alternative‑theory principle to attempted murder counts)
- Krause v. State, 98 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (standard of review for jury instructions is abuse of discretion, constrained by law)
- Lewis v. State, 22 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (sufficient inference of intent where defendant heard co‑defendant’s statements and knew of weapons)
- Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002) (de novo review applies to motions for judgment of acquittal)
- Meyers v. State, 704 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1997) (confessions constitute direct evidence)
- Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974) (standard for denying judgment of acquittal; submit case to jury when reasonable differences of view exist)
- Messer v. State, 757 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (state may prove intent by showing defendant knew perpetrator’s intent)
- State v. Blanton, 821 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (discusses accomplice liability where one contains victims while another shoots)
