440 S.W.3d 779
Tex. App.2013Background
- TSHA appeals BCAD's denial of ad valorem tax exemptions for 2005–2008 for The Cambridge at College Station.
- TSHA previously enjoyed exemptions (2002–2004) but argued exemptions under Texas Education Code § 53.46, Article XI, § 9 (Texas Constitution), and Texas Tax Code § 11.11.
- The Cambridge is a university-affiliated housing facility used for TAMU-related summer programs (4-H Roundup, JAMP, athletic camps) and later hockey and cheer camps.
- Trial court found The Cambridge was not exclusively used for education-related housing in 2005–2008, particularly due to non-university beneficiaries (HMI, UCA) from 2006–2008.
- The Texas Supreme Court applies strict construction of exemptions and analyzes public ownership and exclusive public use/purpose to determine exemptions.
- The court reverses as to 2005 and affirms denial for 2006–2008, concluding exemptions do not apply for those years.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 53.46 exemption applies for 2005 | TSHA asserts 53.46 exemption for housing for TAMU students. | BCAD contends housing not exclusively for students; broader use denied. | Exemption applies for 2005. |
| Whether § 53.46 applies to 2006–2008 with HMI and UCA camps | TSHA argues continued TAMU-linked exemptions extendable to camps. | BCAD argues non-student use defeats exclusivity under 53.46. | Not exempt for 2006–2008. |
| Whether Article XI, § 9 (Constitution) supports exemption for TSHA | TSHA contends TSHA is a governmental instrumentality with public ownership/purpose. | BCAD disputes exclusive public use/purpose under Article XI, § 9. | Public ownership and exclusive public purpose not satisfied for 2006–2008. |
| Whether § 11.11(a) or (e) can salvage exemption | TSHA argues statutory exemptions apply via § 11.11(a) or pro rata under (e). | BCAD contends TSHA lacks public ownership/public purpose; (e) inapplicable. | 11.11(a) and (e) do not exempt TSHA for 2006–2008. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Chem. Bank & Trust Co., 190 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1945) (broad governmental entity interpretation of 'counties, cities or towns')
- LCRA, 190 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1945) (public ownership and purpose considerations)
- Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. 1972) (constitutional provisions interpreted with ownership/purpose analysis)
- Galveston Wharf Co. v. City of Galveston, 63 Tex. 14 (Tex. 1884) (public-use concept for exclusive purposes)
- San Felipe de Austin, 229 S.W. 845 (Tex. 1921) (public-use historical context for public purpose)
- A&M Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Bryan, 184 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. 1945) (expansive view of 'public purpose' in education context)
- Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., 576 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1978) (exclusive public-use standard under Article XI, § 9 context)
- Dallas Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Grand Prairie Hosp. Auth., 730 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987) (exclusive public-use requirement under 11.11(a))
- Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Grand Prairie Hosp. Auth., 707 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986) (exclusive public-use principle in tax exemption context)