Texas Department of Public Safety v. Pedro Monroy Arciniega
11-15-00058-CV
| Tex. App. | Mar 31, 2017Background
- On July 19, 2014, Officer M. Campa observed Pedro Monroy Arciniega driving a white pickup in Sweetwater at about 10:50 p.m.; the truck approached a stopped car at speed and nearly struck it from behind, braking hard and swerving to avoid a collision.
- Officer Campa stopped Arciniega and later sought to suspend his license for refusing a breath specimen following an arrest for DWI; the administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the suspension based on a lawful stop.
- Arciniega sought de novo review in the county court, which reversed the ALJ, finding Officer Campa lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.
- The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) appealed the county court’s reversal to the Eleventh Court of Appeals.
- The administrative record before the appeals court consisted primarily of Officer Campa’s sworn report describing the near-collision and the stop.
- The sole contested legal question was whether Officer Campa had reasonable suspicion to stop Arciniega for a traffic offense (speeding or reckless driving).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Officer Campa had reasonable suspicion to stop Arciniega | Arciniega: officer did not identify a traffic offense and the report does not show a violation | DPS: officer reasonably suspected speeding or reckless driving based on near-collision and unsafe following | Court: reversed county court and held record provides substantial evidence of reasonable suspicion for a stop (reckless driving/assured-clear-distance violation) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mireles v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 1999) (administrative suspension review uses substantial-evidence standard)
- Alford v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 209 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2006) (substantial-evidence review of administrative orders is a question of law)
- Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (reasonable-suspicion standard requires specific, articulable facts evaluated objectively)
- Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (traffic violation committed in officer’s presence authorizes stop)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (stop is reasonable where police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred)
- Fernandez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010) (reckless driving requires willful or wanton disregard; need not cause a wreck)