665 S.W.3d 135
Tex. App.2023Background:
- Plaintiffs (former detainees, a day-care operator, and an advocacy org) challenged a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services rule that designated certain immigration family detention centers ("family residential centers" or FRCs) as general residential operations (GROs) and exempted them from the Minimum Standards barring unrelated adults from sharing bedrooms with children.
- Dilley and Karnes are the two Texas centers at issue; plaintiffs alleged the rule led to unrelated adults sharing bedrooms with children, at least one sexual assault, and longer detention periods for children.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), declaring the FRC Rule invalid as contravening Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 42.002(4) and the chapter’s objectives, and entered injunctive relief (including orders preserving the status quo pending appeal).
- This Court initially reversed on standing; the Texas Supreme Court reversed that ruling and remanded for consideration of other jurisdictional issues and the merits.
- On remand this Court held the detainees’ claims were not moot under the public‑interest exception, affirmed that the Department lacked statutory authority to license/regulate FRCs as GROs (thus invalidating the FRC Rule), rejected GEO’s estoppel argument, but vacated the portion of the injunction ordering the Department to continue investigations/oversight during appeal.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of detainees' claims | Detainees released on parole/bond that can be revoked; not moot | Detainees no longer residents of Dilley/Karnes; controversy moot | Not moot: public‑interest exception applies (case addresses issues of considerable public importance and evades review) |
| "Capable of repetition yet evading review" exception | Short average detention (~11 days) and likelihood future detainees will face same conditions | No evidence these specific plaintiffs will be detained again | First prong met (short duration); second prong not satisfied for these plaintiffs specifically |
| Agency authority to classify/licence FRCs as GROs | Chapter 42 regulates child‑care facilities that care for children in absence of parents; FRCs where parents reside are shelters, not GROs | GRO definition covers 24‑hour care and thus Dilley/Karnes fall within Chapter 42 | Department lacks statutory authority to license/regulate Dilley and Karnes as GROs; FRC Rule invalid under APA |
| Judicial estoppel (GEO) based on Flores consent decree | Plaintiffs benefited from decree requiring state‑licensed placement; cannot now attack licensing | Consent decree presumes lawful state licensing; challenging an unauthorized rule is not inconsistent | No estoppel; plaintiffs may pursue APA challenge |
| Injunctive relief ordering DFPS/HHSC oversight during appeal | Needed to preserve status quo and prevent irreparable harm | Order exceeds court’s merits holding and was not properly pleaded | Portion of Amended Final Judgment ordering the Department to continue investigations/oversight during appeal vacated; remainder of judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 646 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. 2022) (Texas Supreme Court reversing this Court on standing and remanding)
- Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) (mootness requires a live controversy at all stages)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (U.S. 1983) ("capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine limited to exceptional situations)
- Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016) (federal litigation requiring state‑licensed placement for detained minors under Flores consent decree)
- Public Util. Comm’n v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 53 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2001) (agencies have only statutory powers granted by legislature)
- TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Commission on State Emergency Commc’ns, 397 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. 2013) (no deference to agency statutory construction when statute is unambiguous)
- Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (requirements for the capable‑of‑repetition exception)
