Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Bibiana Flores, 555 S.W.3d 656

Flores, a TDCJ correctional officer since 2002, injured her back in 2011 and worsened it in a March 13, 2013 fall; she took FMLA leave and received physical therapy.
Dr. Misenheimer diagnosed spondylolysis/spondylolisthesis, placed Flores on no-work status, then released her to full duty without restrictions on August 28, 2013.
While Flores was on leave, TDCJ investigated alleged misconduct and prepared five disciplinary charges, including alleged improper contact with an inmate and ammunition-log issues.
On her return, Flores was presented the charges, disputes some of them, and claims Major Thompson told her to resign or be fired; she resigned and later sued after obtaining a right-to-sue letter.
Flores pleaded disability discrimination and retaliation under the Texas Labor Code (she nonsuited her reasonable-accommodation claim); TDCJ filed pleas to the jurisdiction.
The trial court denied the plea as to discrimination and retaliation; the Court of Appeals affirmed as to retaliation but dismissed the disability-discrimination claim for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Disability discrimination under Tex. Labor Code §21.105 — whether Flores had a "disability" at the time of the adverse action	Flores contends she has a permanent back condition that can episodically impair major life activities and thus is a disability under the Labor Code (including episodic/remission language)	TDCJ argues Flores was fully released to regular duty on Aug. 28, 2013, so she was not disabled at the time of the alleged adverse action, conclusively negating the element	Court: Dismissed discrimination claim — TDCJ met its initial burden; Flores failed to produce evidence showing her condition is episodic in a way that created a fact issue on substantial limitation at the time of action
Retaliation under Tex. Labor Code §21.055 — whether Flores can show adverse action and causation	Flores argues her request for a shift change/leave was protected, she was constructively discharged (given ultimatum to resign or be fired upon return), and TDCJ retaliated at the first opportunity after her leave	TDCJ argues she voluntarily resigned (no adverse action), the five-month gap defeats causation, and at least one charge would have led to termination regardless (no but-for causation)	Court: Affirmed denial of plea as to retaliation — Flores raised fact issues on constructive discharge, causation (first-opportunity theory), and TDCJ did not conclusively prove termination would have occurred regardless

Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011) (sovereign immunity principles)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to jurisdiction standards; jurisdictional fact evidence)
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (Labor Code waiver of sovereign immunity requires pleading a Labor Code violation)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (standard for resolving jurisdictional fact disputes)
El Paso County v. Vasquez, 508 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016) (discussion of when employee must be disabled at time of adverse action)
Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2010) (constructive discharge qualifies as adverse employment action)