Texas Democratic Party v. Greg Abbott, Gove, 961 F.3d 389

Background

In May 2020 plaintiffs (Texas Democratic Party, party chair, and voters) sued Texas officials seeking a declaration and injunction requiring mail‑in ballots for any voter who wants one because of COVID‑19 risk, arguing lack of immunity qualifies as a "disability" under Tex. Elec. Code §82.002.
The district court granted a sweeping preliminary injunction ordering that any eligible Texas voter who seeks to avoid COVID‑19 may apply for, receive, and cast an absentee ballot, and enjoined state officials from issuing guidance or threats inconsistent with that order.
Texas officials (Governor Abbott, Sec. of State Hughs, AG Paxton, county election administrators) appealed; AG Paxton had earlier sent a letter advising county officials that mere fear of COVID‑19 is not a qualifying disability and warning third‑party advisers about criminal liability for false applications.
The Texas Supreme Court (on expedited review) held a lack of COVID immunity alone is not a "physical condition" qualifying for mail‑in ballots under §82.002.
The Fifth Circuit granted a stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction pending appeal, finding multiple procedural and substantive infirmities in the district court’s ruling and emphasizing state deference on election and public‑health measures.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Equal Protection (age) – whether §82.003 (mail ballots for 65+) violates Equal Protection	§82.003 facially discriminates by age and burdens younger voters during pandemic; strict scrutiny or heightened review applies	Statute creates an absentee‑ballot exception; McDonald controls so only rational‑basis review applies and the law is rationally related to protecting older voters and preventing fraud	Court: Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed; McDonald governs → rational‑basis review applies; §82.003 likely survives
Twenty‑Sixth Amendment (age) – whether statute denies or abridges voting on account of age	Denies equal access to mail ballots because of age, so abridges right to vote under 26th Amendment	Same as Equal Protection: no denial of the franchise, only differential absentee access; McDonald logic applies	Court: Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed; rational‑basis review applies under McDonald; no denial/abridgment of the right to vote
Void‑for‑Vagueness – whether "disability" in Tex. Elec. Code is unconstitutionally vague	Multiple constructions and official statements create uncertainty about who may apply for mail ballots	Texas provides a statutory definition of "disability" and the Texas Supreme Court clarified it; term gives reasonable notice	Court: Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed; statute not so vague as to be no rule at all
First Amendment / §1985 (voter intimidation/conspiracy) – whether AG Paxton’s letter chilled speech or constituted intimidation/conspiracy	Paxton’s letter threatened criminal prosecution and intimidated voters/advocates; supports §1985 conspiracy claim	Paxton publicly stated his legal interpretation; no conspiracy of multiple actors; letters are permitted governmental speech and Paxton has enforcement authority—no intimidation shown	Court: Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed; §1985 fails (no conspiracy and no deprivation), Paxton’s statements are lawful/governmental speech or, at minimum, not shown to be threats sufficient to invoke liability
Jurisdictional: standing, political question, sovereign immunity, abstention	Plaintiffs asserted justiciable federal claims and challenged state officials as enforcers	Defendants argued political‑question/abstention (Pullman), lack of standing as to Governor, sovereign immunity (Ex parte Young requirements)	Court: Stay appropriate—Pullman abstention was arguably warranted; but on standing Ex parte Young likely applies to Sec. of State (not to Governor); sovereign immunity does not bar relief against officials with enforcement connection
Remedy scope / timing (pre‑election injunction)	Plaintiffs sought immediate expansion of mail‑in voting to all eligible voters for safety	Defendants: State has strong interests in administering elections and preventing fraud; courts should not change election rules on eve of election	Court: State irreparably harmed by enjoining statutory scheme close to election; public interest favors stay pending appeal

Key Cases Cited

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1905) (principle of deference to state public‑health measures)
McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (U.S. 1969) (denial of absentee ballot does not necessarily deny franchise; rational‑basis review governs many absentee‑ballot claims)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (U.S. 2009) (stay‑pending‑appeal standard and four‑factor test)
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1908) (sovereign immunity exception permitting prospective relief against state officials)
R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (U.S. 1941) (Pullman abstention doctrine — federal courts should wait for controlling state‑law rulings when state law is unclear)
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (U.S. 1974) (states’ authority to regulate time, place, and manner of elections)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (U.S. 1992) (framework for evaluating burdens on voting rights)
O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (U.S. 1974) (distinguishing cases where state action precludes other means to vote)
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (recognition of heightened fraud risk in mail‑in voting; context for election‑integrity interests)