Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. Exxon Mobil Corporation ExxonMobil Oil Corporation Pennzoil-Quaker State Company And Shell Oil Company
504 S.W.3d 532
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) issued a unilateral Final Administrative Order (the Voda Order) requiring ExxonMobil, Shell, and others to pay response costs for cleanup of the Voda Petroleum State Superfund Site. The Order referenced both Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 361.188 and 361.272.
- ExxonMobil and Shell appealed the Order in Travis County district court, seeking declaratory relief and challenging the Order’s validity; TCEQ counterclaimed for cost recovery and enforcement.
- After years of litigation and discovery, TCEQ filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing the Order was issued only under § 361.188 and therefore reviewable only under § 361.321’s substantial-evidence standard (a limited record review), not § 361.322’s preponderance-of-evidence trial de novo.
- TCEQ argued the two ordering provisions (§§ 361.188 and 361.272) are mutually exclusive and carry distinct waivers of sovereign immunity; ExxonMobil and Shell argued an order may be issued under both provisions and that § 361.322 applies, requiring the Commission to prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The trial court denied TCEQ’s plea to the jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals held § 361.322 applies to orders issued under § 361.188 as well as § 361.272 and affirmed the denial of the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (TCEQ) | Defendant's Argument (ExxonMobil & Shell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 361.188 and § 361.272 orders are mutually exclusive | The statute creates two distinct, exclusive ordering schemes; one order cannot invoke both sections | Nothing in the Act prevents a single order from invoking both sections; both can apply | Not exclusive; an order can be issued under both §§ 361.188 and 361.272 |
| Which appellate standard governs an order issued under § 361.188 | § 361.188 orders are governed solely by § 361.321 (substantial‑evidence review); § 361.322 does not apply | § 361.322 applies to administrative orders under § 361.272 and, via § 361.188(b), also applies to § 361.188 orders, so preponderance standard governs | § 361.322 applies to § 361.188 orders; preponderance‑of‑evidence standard governs appeals under § 361.322 |
| Whether courts lack jurisdiction to review the Voda Order under § 361.322 (sovereign immunity) | Because § 361.322 does not apply to § 361.188 orders, no waiver of immunity exists for the Voda Order except under § 361.321 | § 361.322 contains a waiver of sovereign immunity and, because it applies to § 361.188 orders, courts have jurisdiction for review under § 361.322 | Court has jurisdiction; § 361.322 contains a waiver of immunity and applies to the Voda Order |
Key Cases Cited
- Texas Comm’n on Envt’l Quality v. City of Waco, 413 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. 2013) (discussed standard of review in agency permitting context and agency record opportunities)
- R.R. Street & Co. v. Pilgrim Enters., 166 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2005) (describing the Solid Waste Disposal Act as Texas counterpart to federal RCRA and CERCLA)
- Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. 2008) (statutory interpretation principle: avoid rendering statutory language meaningless)
- First State Bank of DeQueen v. Texas Lottery Comm’n, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) (statutory construction: discern legislative intent from statute text)