Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127

Tew pled guilty to statutory rape involving a 22-year-old and a 14-year-old victim.
Indicted on nine counts; after plea, eight counts were dismissed and only statutory rape plea remained.
At sentencing, Tew sought first offender treatment and argued under OCGA 17-10-6.2 and 42-8-60.
Trial court found Tew ineligible for first offender status, but required sexual offender registration and a ten-year probation with sex-offender conditions.
Court held discretionary first-offender treatment is not available here; interpreted OCGA 17-10-6.2 (c)(1) to limit deviation to mandatory minimum sentences; in pari materia with OCGA 42-8-60; Planas and related authorities support exclusion of those over 21.
Judgment affirmed on March 6, 2013.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tew was legally eligible for first offender treatment.	Tew (Tew) contends 17-10-6.2(c)(1) allows deviation to grant first offender status.	State argues first offender status is prohibited for sexual offenses per 42-8-60 and 17-10-6.2; the court must follow statutory text.	No; first offender status not permitted; statute excludes such status for certain sexual offenses.

Planas v. State, 296 Ga. App. 51 (2009) (excludes first offender treatment for over-21 statutory rape defendants when interpreting 17-10-6.2 and 42-8-60)
Fulton County v. Colon, 316 Ga. App. 883 (2012) (parens materia and statutory interpretation applied to relate 17-10-6.2 and 42-8-60)
Ailara v. State, 311 Ga. App. 862 (2011) (supports statutory construction related to first offender eligibility)
Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga. App. 558 (2011) (applies statutory interpretation principles in context of sex-offense sentencing)
Camarón v. State, 246 Ga. App. 80 (2000) (age-based exclusion from first offender treatment for statutory rape)
Aimwell, Inc. v. McLendon Enterprises, 318 Ga. App. 394 (2012) (statutory construction principles; in pari materia considerations)