Teurlings v. Larson
156 Idaho 65
| Idaho | 2014Background
- Martinez, a National Guard member, was involved in a car collision with Teurlings while returning from training on Jan 7, 2007.
- Teurlings sued Martinez for personal injury and economic damages under Idaho law; Martinez asserted immunity under I.C. § 6-904(4) ITCA.
- District court granted summary judgment, holding Martinez was “engaged in training or duty” under Title 32 and within the course and scope of employment.
- Teurlings argued Martinez was not engaged in training or duty and was not acting within the course and scope at the time of the accident.
- The district court relied on 38 U.S.C. § 101(22) to define active duty for training and on a special errand exception to find coverage; Teurlings appealed.
- The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on these issues, remanding for further proceedings, and affirmed denial of the motion to strike; costs on appeal awarded to Teurlings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether I.C. § 6-904(4) immunity applies to Martinez. | Martinez was not on training or duty at the moment of the collision. | Martinez was on duty under 32 U.S.C. § 502 and engaged in training or duty. | Immunity not resolved; genuine issues of material fact remained. |
| Whether Martinez was engaged in training or duty at the time of the accident. | She was traveling home after duty and not engaged in training. | Her trip occurred during a duty period and/or pursuant to orders. | Material facts exist; not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. |
| Whether the decision on scope of employment should borrow the coming-and-going rule from workers’ compensation. | The rule should extend to include certain exceptions that bring travel within employment scope. | Idaho should not borrow the rule for respondeat superior; assess scope under Idaho law. | Court declined to borrow the rule or its exceptions; analyzed scope under respondeat superior. |
| Whether the district court properly denied Teurlings’ motion to strike affidavits. | Affidavits contain inadmissible legal conclusions about being on duty. | Statements were based on personal knowledge and admissible. | No abuse of discretion; denial of motion to strike affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686 (2013) (reiterates liberal ITCA interpretation to favor liability with narrow immunity exceptions)
- Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400 (2011) (scope of employment tied to respondeat superior applicability)
- Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894 (2007) (defines scope of employment in respondeat superior context)
- Slade v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 119 Idaho 482 (1991) (outlines scope of employment factors for tort liability)
- Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1994) (distinguishes National Guard line-of-duty from FTCA liability scope)
- Murray ex rel. Murray v. United States, 258 F.Supp.2d 1006 (D. Minn. 2003) (inactive duty travel not within FTCA liability absent orders/necessity)
- Mortise v. United States, 102 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1996) (National Guard engaged in training; federal employee status during training)