Testa's, Inc. v. Jack Coopersmith, 105 A.3d 1037

Testa’s, Inc. owns contiguous parcels including a rear parking lot; Jack and Sherri Coopersmith own two adjoining commercial parcels whose rears abut that lot.
In the 1970s Testa’s planned construction of a retaining wall and gates that would block historical rear access used by the Coopersmiths’ predecessors; plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order and sued in 1977.
The parties executed a written June 1978 agreement providing that Riccardo and the Sanborns “shall have access by foot or motor vehicle over lands of Testa” to the westerly/southerly sides of their parcels; gates would operate by tokens/keys and access could be terminated for abuse.
The agreement was followed for years (tokens used, gates in place), recorded in 1981; tokens/gates removed in 1993; properties later changed hands (Coopersmiths purchased in 2005).
Testa’s sued in 2010 seeking a declaration that no right-of-way existed; trial court found the 1978 agreement created an appurtenant easement, and alternatively found a prescriptive easement; Testa’s appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Testa’s)	Defendant's Argument (Coopersmiths)	Held
Whether the 1978 agreement is enforceable despite one original party (Riccardo) not signing	Agreement invalid because Riccardo did not sign	Agreement enforceable: only parties needed signed; Riccardo implicitly consented and her conduct (through Purcell) showed assent	Enforceable: trial court’s factual findings that Riccardo consented were not clearly erroneous
Whether the 1978 agreement granted an easement or merely a revocable license	Language (including termination for abuse) shows only a license	Language grants permanent access benefiting dominant estates; termination clause is a conditional defeasance, not revocation at will	Agreement unambiguously created an appurtenant easement; Chapman’s extrinsic testimony properly excluded
Whether an easement subject to termination for abuse is inconsistent with an easement (i.e., renders it a license)	Termination language renders it revocable and thus a license	An easement can be defeasible or subject to termination on specified events; that does not make it a license	Easement may be defeasible; here termination for abuse did not convert it into a license
Whether to reach prescriptive-easement claim	N/A (Testa’s primary challenge to express easement)	Coopersmiths alternatively claimed a prescriptive easement	Court did not reach prescriptive-easement question because it affirmed express easement

McClare v. Rocha, 86 A.3d 22 (Me. 2014) (contract formation and fact-review standard)
Pelletier v. Pelletier, 36 A.3d 903 (Me. 2012) (deference to trial court fact findings)
Anchors v. Manter, 714 A.2d 134 (Me. 1998) (ambiguity in easement language and use of extrinsic evidence)
Laux v. Harrington, 38 A.3d 318 (Me. 2012) (scope of easement determined from deed language)
Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 A.2d 592 (Me. 2001) (definition and types of easements)
Wentworth v. Sebra, 829 A.2d 520 (Me. 2003) (appurtenant vs. in gross easements)
Reed v. A. C. McLoon & Co., 311 A.2d 548 (Me. 1973) (distinction between easement and license)