Tesfaye v. Walrath
1:17-cv-00160
| E.D. Va. | Feb 13, 2018Background
- In November 2012 petitioner Nahom Tesfaye was accused of raping E.S.; he pleaded guilty in Fairfax County Circuit Court in September 2013 and received a 20-year sentence with 10 years suspended and lifetime probation.
- At plea hearing the Commonwealth proffered that E.S. was intoxicated and awoke to find Tesfaye on top of her having intercourse; Tesfaye (through counsel) asserted an alternative narrative that E.S. consented while mistaking him for another man ("Jesse").
- Before plea Tesfaye exchanged contradictory texts and statements: initial denials, later admissions in texts and to police (after a failed polygraph) that he had sex with E.S. and that she may have thought he was Jesse.
- Tesfaye filed a state habeas petition raising five claims (ineffective assistance for failing to pursue fraud-in-the-inducement defense; due process re: plea; Brady; Padilla/SVP advice; and counsel’s handling of a polygraph). The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, denied relief, and the Virginia Supreme Court refused appeal.
- In state court the judge found counsel deficient for not knowing the fraud-in-the-inducement defense but concluded Tesfaye suffered no Strickland prejudice because (a) the defense likely was unavailable given his admissions that he told E.S. he was Nahom, and (b) Tesfaye’s inconsistent statements destroyed his credibility and made it objectively unreasonable to reject the plea.
- The federal district court applied AEDPA deference and denied Tesfaye’s federal §2254 petition, dismissing claims as (where applicable) procedurally defaulted or not showing unreasonable application of federal law or Strickland prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance for failing to research/litigate "fraud-in-the-inducement" defense | Counsel failed to investigate or advise on a potential defense that would vitiate consent; counsel was deficient and petitioner was prejudiced | Even if counsel was deficient, petitioner cannot show prejudice because his shifting statements and admissions made trial objectively unreasonable and the defense likely unavailable | Court: Counsel was deficient but no Strickland prejudice; claim dismissed |
| 2. Due process: guilty plea lacked proof beyond reasonable doubt | Guilty plea conviction violated due process because the record purportedly lacked proof beyond reasonable doubt | Guilty plea waived non-jurisdictional defects; claim is procedurally defaulted and cannot be relitigated via habeas | Court: Procedural default; claim dismissed |
| 3. Ineffective assistance for failing to advise re: Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commitment (Padilla) | Counsel had a duty under Padilla to advise about civil-commitment risk and failed to do so | Padilla applies to nearly automatic collateral consequences (e.g., deportation), but SVP commitment is not automatic and requires separate hearings and clear-and-convincing proof | Court: State court reasonably applied Padilla; no deficient performance under AEDPA; claim dismissed |
| 4. Ineffective assistance re: polygraph (arranging, not attending, failing to challenge) | Counsel erred by arranging a police polygraph, failing to attend, and failing to challenge/use results properly | Counsel reasonably relied on petitioner’s assertions of innocence; even if failure to attend was deficient, petitioner cannot show causal link or prejudice from counsel’s absence or lack of a second test | Court: No Strickland prejudice; claim dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance test)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice standard for ineffective assistance in plea context)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must advise re: certain clear, direct collateral consequences)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (AEDPA deference principles)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (procedural default doctrine in federal habeas)
- Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (deference to state court rulings where later review was summary)
