Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486

In 1986 Congress amended 21 U.S.C. §841 to create three penalty tiers for drug distribution: (A) and (B) set quantity-based mandatory minimums (with a 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio), while (C) criminalized possession-with-intent to distribute an unspecified amount and carried no mandatory minimum.
Terry pleaded guilty in 2008 under §841(b)(1)(C) for possession with intent to distribute crack; the district court found ~4 grams and sentenced him to 188 months after applying the career-offender Guideline.
The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act raised the crack thresholds (5→28 grams and 50→280 grams), reducing the disparity, but its changes were not initially retroactive.
The Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reflect the Fair Sentencing Act and made those Guidelines changes retroactive, but many offenders (e.g., career offenders or those sentenced under §841(b)(1)(C)) remained ineligible for relief.
The First Step Act (2018) made certain Fair Sentencing Act changes retroactive for persons who had a “sentence for a covered offense,” defining “covered offense” as a violation whose "statutory penalties" were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act; Terry sought relief under the First Step Act but was denied at district court and on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Terry)	Defendant's Argument (United States)	Held
Whether an offender convicted under §841(b)(1)(C) is eligible for First Step Act relief	Terry: "Covered offense" includes any crack conviction affected as a practical matter by the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act, so §841(b)(1)(C) offenders should qualify	U.S.: "Covered offense" means an offense whose statutory penalties were actually modified by the Fair Sentencing Act (i.e., A/B mandatory-minimum tiers), so (C) offenders are not covered	Court: Eligibility requires that the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for the specific offense; §841(b)(1)(C) penalties were unchanged, so Terry is not eligible
Whether changes to other provisions or the broader penalty scheme suffice to "modify" the statutory penalties for §841(b)(1)(C)	Terry: The Fair Sentencing Act altered the penalty scheme in ways that affect (C) offenders in practice	U.S.: Only a concrete change to the statutory penalties for the particular offense qualifies	Court: "Modify" means an actual change to the statutory penalties for the offense; altering other provisions or charging practices does not make (C) a covered offense

United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020) (interpretation of statutory-phrase focus in First Step Act context)
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (definition of "modify")
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (criticized the 100:1 crack-to-powder sentencing disparity)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (discussed public perception and fairness of crack sentencing disparity)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory)
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (rule about ignoring extraneous indictment language)
United States v. Birt, 966 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2020) (example that subsection (C) charges can involve sizable quantities)