Terry Deon Noble v. State
07-16-00105-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 18, 2017Background
- At ~3:00 a.m. in downtown Amarillo, Terry Deon Noble (Appellant) revved and then rapidly accelerated a red Ford Mustang at a traffic light next to uniformed Officer Michael Clay Rolan in an undercover vehicle.
- Officer Rolan stopped Noble for violating Amarillo Municipal Code § 16-3-116(e) (exhibition of sudden speed/acceleration that produces noise, smoking tires, or lifts tires from the road).
- A warrantless search of Noble’s vehicle after the stop uncovered 27.22 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine; Noble was arrested and later indicted for possession with intent to deliver (4–200 g).
- Noble challenged the municipal ordinance as unconstitutionally vague (both for lack of fair notice and for inviting arbitrary enforcement) and moved to suppress evidence; the trial court denied the motion.
- Noble pleaded guilty to the drug offense with two prior-felony enhancements and received a 35-year sentence; he appealed the denial of the suppression motion arguing the ordinance was vague as applied to his conduct.
- The court affirmed, concluding the ordinance (read as prohibiting sudden speed/acceleration that produces noise, smoking tires, or tire lift) provided fair notice and limited officer discretion; the stop and search were upheld.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amarillo Mun. Code § 16-3-116(e) is unconstitutionally vague as applied | Noble: the ordinance fails to give ordinary notice and allows arbitrary enforcement, particularly the "noise" element (given federal noise standards) | State: the ordinance proscribes a sudden acceleration that produces cognizable effects (noise, smoking tires, tire lift); the stop targeted that conduct | Held: Ordinance not unconstitutionally vague as applied; "sudden" limits subjectivity and other listed consequences (smoking tires/tire lift) supply concrete boundaries |
| Whether evidence from the stop should be suppressed because the ordinance is void | Noble: suppression necessary because stop lacked lawful basis if ordinance is vague | State: constitutionality challenge goes to the stop’s legality but ordinance is valid | Held: Denial of motion to suppress affirmed; stop was lawful under the ordinance |
Key Cases Cited
- Mill v. Brown, 316 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. 1958) (municipal ordinances construed like statutes)
- Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (presumption of validity for statutes/ordinances)
- State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (void-for-vagueness doctrine: fair notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement)
- Meisner v. State, 907 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995) (ordinance prohibiting "unnecessary noise" was unconstitutionally vague)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vague laws impermissibly delegate policy to enforcers and risk arbitrary application)
- Meuret v. State, 500 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (plain and ordinary meaning governs undefined statutory terms)
- Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (standards for reviewing suppression and related rulings)