159 A.3d 79
R.I.2017Background
- Terry Andoscia was appointed assistant zoning inspector by North Smithfield for consecutive two-year terms beginning in 2002, 2004, 2006, and a letter in December 2008 notified him of another two-year appointment expiring December 1, 2010.
- On February 6, 2009, the town told Andoscia not to report to work and stopped paying him due to budget cuts; termination was for budgetary reasons, not for cause.
- Andoscia sued in Superior Court for breach of employment contract and a constitutional (due process) claim; the jury-waived trial occurred in June 2014.
- The trial justice found no evidence of negotiation, mutuality of obligation, or bargained-for consideration creating a guaranteed two-year contract; testimony supported that the appointment was pursuant to a town ordinance.
- North Smithfield’s ordinance provides that the part-time zoning officer ‘‘shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the town administrator.’’
- The trial justice entered judgment for the town; Andoscia appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding no enforceable contract existed. The constitutional and charter-vs-ordinance arguments were not pursued on appeal and/or waived.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the December 2008 appointment letter created an enforceable two-year employment contract | Andoscia: the appointment letter promised a two-year term ending Dec. 1, 2010, creating contractual rights | Town: employee serves at the pleasure of the town administrator; letter was informational, not a binding contract | No contract; letter + circumstances insufficient to show meeting of minds or bargained-for exchange |
| Whether there was mutuality of obligation/consideration to support a contract | Andoscia: implicit term of fixed two-year employment constituted consideration | Town: no negotiation or exchange; no evidence town bargained away right to terminate at pleasure | No mutuality or consideration shown; contract formation elements absent |
| Whether the town ordinance precludes a contract limiting termination to for-cause only | Andoscia: argued at oral argument the charter/ordinance conflict might limit removal | Town: ordinance plainly states service at pleasure of administrator | Court relied on ordinance language and found any implied for-cause limitation would conflict; no evidence town waived ordinance rights |
| Whether plaintiff preserved constitutional or charter-conflict claims for appeal | Andoscia: alleged due-process/property-right violation in complaint; raised charter conflict at oral argument | Town: these issues either not pursued at trial or insufficiently developed on appeal | Court declined to address constitutional and charter-conflict issues as not raised/preserved for appellate review |
Key Cases Cited
- Bank of America, N.A. v. P.T.A. Realty, LLC, 132 A.3d 689 (R.I. 2016) (standard for reviewing trial-justice findings in non-jury cases)
- Haviland v. Simmons, 45 A.3d 1246 (R.I. 2012) (contracts interpreted de novo; offer and acceptance required for contract formation)
- Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404 (R.I. 2016) (elements required for valid contract; mutuality of obligation)
- DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382 (R.I. 2011) (consideration and bargained-for exchange test)
- DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274 (R.I. 2007) (discussion of consideration and contract formation)
- Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1989) (offer and acceptance as indispensable to contract formation)