Terrance Shaw v. Paul Kemper, 52 F.4th 331

Plaintiff Terrance Shaw, wheelchair-bound and incontinent, twice in 2018 and a third time later that year could not access the handicapped toilet because non-disabled inmates occupied it, and each time he defecated on himself.
After the first two incidents Shaw reported the problem; prison staff said they could not reserve the accessible stall or control other inmates’ bathroom use.
On the third occasion Shaw attempted to reach another restroom, painfully dragging himself ~180 feet before again soiling himself.
Shaw sued under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act (and raised constitutional claims); the district court screened and dismissed the ADA/RA claims for failure to state a claim.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed Shaw’s pro se complaint de novo, concluding the complaint plausibly alleged denial of a service and failure to make reasonable modifications, and vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Shaw plausibly allege denial of a service under Title II/RA?	Shaw: inaccessible handicapped toilet denied a needed service, causing injury.	Defendants: at most an inconvenience of prison life; no denial of service.	Held: Allegations suffice to plausibly allege denial of a service.
Was Shaw a "qualified individual with a disability" under the statutes?	Shaw: wheelchair-bound and incontinent, therefore disabled.	Defendants: (did not dispute disability).	Held: Parties agree and court treats Shaw as a qualified individual with a disability.
Did staff fail to provide reasonable modifications/ accommodations?	Shaw: staff refused to reserve or otherwise ensure his access, showing failure to accommodate.	Defendants: staff cannot control other inmates’ restroom use; measures were reasonable.	Held: Allegations plausibly state a failure to provide reasonable modifications; survives screening.
Is deliberate indifference required and was it shown for damages?	Shaw: alleged intentional denial and harm from lack of access.	Defendants: damages require proof of intentional conduct/deliberate indifference; sovereign-immunity defenses may apply.	Held: Plaintiff must later prove deliberate indifference to recover damages; complaint survives screening so defendants may develop defenses on remand.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se complaint allegations must be accepted as true at pleading stage)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015) (pleading standard for prisoner suits)
Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012) (comparison of ADA/RA frameworks)
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (liberal construction of pro se pleadings)
Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2018) (deliberate indifference standard for damages under ADA/RA)
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (damages under ADA/RA require intentional discrimination)
Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006) (Title II reasonable modification theory)
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (refusal to accommodate hygiene needs can deny a service)
Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015) (distinguished: inconvenience vs. actual denial; resolved at summary judgment in that case)