Terrance Davis v. State, 06-15-00011-CR

Background

Defendant Terrence Lavon Davis was convicted by a Bowie County jury of aggravated robbery (offense dated Jan. 17, 2014) and sentenced to 55 years and a $10,000 fine after pleading true to an enhancement paragraph.
Prosecution’s case relied principally on accomplice testimony from co-defendant Calvin Whaley, who implicated Davis as the man who displayed the gun in the store surveillance video.
The State’s only purported corroborating witness was Toni Rutledge (the mother of Davis’s children), who testified she believed the voice and hoodie in the robbery video were Davis’s; her credibility and bias were contested at trial.
The store clerk’s identifications were equivocal: he initially said he could identify the gunman but later identified a different person (Morris Mitchell) and admitted changing his view after talking with prosecutors.
Defense contends (1) accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated by non-accomplice evidence, (2) the jury instruction on accomplice testimony improperly limited corroboration to "other testimony" rather than all other evidence, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying a continuance after the State allegedly misled defense counsel about Rutledge’s intended identification testimony.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Davis)	Held (as argued in brief)
1. Sufficiency of corroboration for accomplice testimony	Whaley’s testimony is credible and supported identification evidence (Rutledge, clerk, video).	Whaley’s testimony is uncorroborated because remaining evidence (Rutledge, clerk, physical evidence) does not tend to connect Davis to the offense.	Appellant argues reversal is required because corroboration was insufficient.
2. Jury instruction on accomplice testimony	Given instruction properly informed jury Whaley was an accomplice and required corroboration.	Instruction was erroneous because it limited corroboration to “other testimony,” excluding non-testimonial evidence and depriving jury of full context.	Appellant argues the charge was legally insufficient and harmful.
3. Denial of continuance after alleged State misrepresentation	State provided witness list and disclosed 404(b) matter; no undue surprise or prejudice to defense.	Defense was misled about Rutledge’s role (told she would testify only to extraneous possession), was deprived time to obtain experts/witnesses, and was prejudiced.	Appellant argues denial of continuance was abuse of discretion warranting new trial.
4. Request to suppress identification evidence	State maintains identifications were timely and properly disclosed.	Defense moved to suppress voice/identification evidence as undisclosed and prejudicial under Article 39.14 and Morton Act.	Appellant asserts suppression motion should have been granted or relief given.

Key Cases Cited

Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (court must exclude accomplice testimony and examine remaining evidence to determine if it tends to connect accused to the offense)
Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (corroboration requirement: exclude accomplice testimony and evaluate remaining evidence)
Moron v. State, 779 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (corroborating evidence need only tend to connect defendant to crime, not be sufficient alone)
Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (trial court must instruct jury when witness is accomplice)
Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (accomplice-witness instruction reviewed under Almanza standard and is part of law of the case)
Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (procedural framework for reviewing accomplice-witness instructions)
Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (continuance rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion; prejudice must be shown)
Barney v. State, 698 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (disclosure of witness identity alone does not necessarily excuse surprise; deception may constitute surprise requiring relief)