Terrance Davis v. State, 06-15-00011-CR

Terrence Lavon Davis was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to 55 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
Co-defendant/accomplice Calvin Whaley testified that he and Davis committed the robbery; Whaley’s testimony was treated as accomplice evidence.
The State presented non-accomplice corroboration: surveillance video and stills, the pants Davis wore at arrest, Detective Thacker’s opinion that Davis’s voice matched the surveillance audio, and testimony from Davis’s long-time girlfriend Toni Rutledge identifying Davis by voice, gait, clothing, and left-handedness.
Defense challenged sufficiency of corroboration, the adequacy of the accomplice-witness jury instruction, and sought a continuance claiming surprise about Rutledge’s identifying testimony.
Trial court denied the continuance and submitted an accomplice corroboration instruction; defense did not object to the form of the charge at trial (only argued insufficiency of evidence).
The State appeals brief argues: corroboration was sufficient; the charge was adequate (and any unpreserved error was not egregiously harmful); and the denial of continuance was not an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Davis)	Held
Sufficiency of corroboration for accomplice testimony	Non-accomplice evidence (Rutledge ID, video/stills, pants, detective voice comparison) tends to connect Davis to the offense and satisfies art. 38.14	Whaley is an accomplice; State failed to provide sufficient independent evidence to corroborate Whaley’s testimony	Court (State brief position) — corroboration is sufficient; non‑accomplice evidence tends to connect Davis to crime
Adequacy of accomplice-witness jury instruction; harm from any error	Charge satisfied the legal elements required for accomplice instruction; defendant failed to object to the charge form, so review is for egregious harm only	Instruction misstated law by referring to "other testimony" instead of "other evidence," potentially misleading jury	Court (State position) — instruction adequate; even if error existed, unpreserved error did not cause egregious harm
Denial of continuance based on surprise of Rutledge’s ID testimony	State disclosed Rutledge on witness list and in notices; defense had opportunity to interview; no actual prejudice shown	Defense claims prosecutors misled about scope of Rutledge’s testimony and was prejudiced, warranting continuance	Court (State position) — denial not an abuse of discretion because defense was aware of witness and not actually prejudiced

Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (defines accomplice-corroboration test)
Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (eliminate accomplice testimony then assess remaining evidence)
Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (corroboration may be direct or circumstantial)
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (harm analysis for jury-charge error)
Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (harm standards and reversal principles)
Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (standard of review for denial of continuance)