Terral Lerron Golden v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 71A03-1601-CR-167

On Sept. 15, 2015 Golden shot and killed Arles Slaven and was later charged with murder and attempted murder; jury convicted him after a three-day trial.
Golden repeatedly requested a speedy trial and repeatedly waived counsel, insisting on proceeding pro se despite the trial court’s multiple, detailed warnings about the dangers of self-representation and offers to appoint counsel (which would have delayed trial).
The trial court conducted multiple colloquies (pretrial and at start of trial), confirmed Golden’s education and criminal-history background, and warned him that conviction carried severe sentences and that he likely would not be released because of out-of-state holds.
During voir dire the State used a peremptory strike on Juror 49, an African-American who had been argumentative with the prosecutor and had refused to answer one question; Golden raised a Batson challenge.
Trial court found the State provided a race-neutral reason (juror’s negative attitude/‘wasting time’ and refusal to answer), overruled the Batson challenge, and Golden was convicted.
On appeal Golden argued (1) his waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent, and (2) the Batson ruling was erroneous. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Golden)	Held
Validity of waiver of counsel	Court’s colloquies and repeated advisements satisfied Faretta/Tovar standards; Golden knowingly chose pro se to preserve speedy trial	Waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made because risks were not adequately explained	Waiver valid; court’s extensive repeated warnings and record of Golden’s sophistication show waiver was knowing and intelligent
Batson challenge to peremptory strike of Juror 49	Prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason (juror’s negative attitude, refusal to answer, wasting time); trial court properly credited that explanation	Strike was racially motivated; Batson requires reversal because juror was African-American	Affirmed: trial court did not clearly err in accepting the facially race-neutral explanation; Batson would not necessarily apply to alternate jurors but decision affirmed even if it did

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognizes defendant’s right to self-representation and requirement that waiver be knowing and voluntary)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (no rigid script required; inquiry depends on specifics of case and defendant)
Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. 2011) (Indiana standards for assessing knowing/ intelligent Faretta waiver)
United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (factors to consider in Faretta waiver: court inquiry, record evidence, defendant background, context)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (three-step test for race-based peremptory challenges)
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (race-neutral explanations need not be persuasive, absent inherent discriminatory intent)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (trial court’s credibility findings in Batson review entitled to deference)
Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 2012) (Batson principles; exclusion of sole African-American juror raises inference of discrimination)
Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. 2007) (strategic Faretta waivers are probative of knowing choice)