Teresa Yearns v. Koss Construction Company, 964 F.3d 671

Yearns was hired by Koss in May 2013, completed Quality Control training in 2014, but was not promoted to a salaried QCT position.
In June 2015 Yearns complained to Koss’s Loss Prevention officer about not being promoted and being paid less than male peers; Harmon and another executive informed division manager David Vestal, who allegedly said, “If we didn’t have these women, we wouldn’t have all these problems.”
Koss says the Pratt Project and overall Kansas work were winding down in August 2015; Vestal offered Yearns a transfer, which she refused; Vestal terminated Yearns on August 22, 2015. The Separation Notice stated she was laid off for lack of work, had found other employment, and was not eligible for rehire.
Yearns obtained other employment in September 2015 and sued Koss two years later alleging EPA retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for Koss and Yearns appealed.
The Eighth Circuit assumed Yearns made a prima facie showing but found Koss articulated a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason (lack of work and refusal to transfer) and held Yearns failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that that reason was pretextual.

Issue	Yearns' Argument	Koss' Argument	Held
Did Yearns engage in protected activity under the EPA?	She complained about pay discrimination to company officials.	Not disputed; court assumed protected activity.	Court assumed Yearns satisfied this element.
Was there a causal connection between the complaint and termination?	Temporal proximity and Vestal’s comment show causation.	Termination resulted from project wind‑down and refusal to transfer.	Court assumed prima facie causation but moved to pretext analysis.
Is Koss’s proffered reason (lack of work) factually baseless?	Tackett’s presence at Pratt after termination shows work remained.	Tackett was a more senior salaried QCT with different duties; project hours and headcount fell sharply after August.	Yearns failed to present evidence creating a genuine factual dispute that the lack‑of‑work explanation was false.
Was a retaliatory motive more likely (animus/pretext)?	Vestal’s “these women” remark and the “not eligible for rehire” notation show retaliation.	Vestal offered a transfer; the comment was isolated; the rehire notation was consistent with policy because Yearns had found other employment and would not be available.	Court held animus evidence was weak/conclusory and no comparator evidence was shown; Yearns did not create a genuine issue of pretext.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
Grey v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2005) (applies McDonnell Douglas to EPA retaliation claims)
Donathan v. Oakley Grain, Inc., 861 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2017) (immediate replacement can rebut a lack‑of‑work defense)
Rose‑Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 1998) (conclusory affidavits cannot create a genuine fact issue)
Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002) (need comparable employees treated differently to show pretext)
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008) (relevance of other supervisors’ actions depends on factual similarity)
Hutchins v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 177 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999) (applies FLSA anti‑retaliation analysis to EPA claims)