Teresa Bierman v. Governor Mark Dayton, 817 F.3d 1070

Background

Minnesota enacted the Individual Providers of Direct Support Services Representation Act (Minn. Stat. § 179A.54), designating individual homecare providers as state employees solely for purposes of collective-bargaining under PELRA.
SEIU petitioned for a mail-ballot election to be the exclusive representative; BMS mailed ballots August 1, 2014, with returns due August 25, 2014.
Nine individual homecare providers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Act and certification process violate their First Amendment freedom of association by compelling association via majority-vote certification.
The district court initially found Count I (compelled association) unripe pending the election outcome and denied preliminary relief as to other claims; after SEIU won a majority and was certified, plaintiffs renewed a motion for preliminary injunction, which the district court denied on the merits.
Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the renewed preliminary injunction; the Eighth Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal as moot because the election and certification had already occurred and the preliminary relief plaintiffs sought could no longer prevent that event.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Act's certification procedure compels association in violation of the First Amendment	Certification forces providers to be represented by a union against their associational rights	The Act lawfully subjects providers to PELRA procedures; no First Amendment violation	Appeal dismissed as moot because election and certification already occurred; merits not reached on interlocutory appeal
Whether interlocutory appeal of denial of preliminary injunction remains justiciable after the complained-of event occurred	Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief preventing certification (and argued decertification could follow)	Defendants argued the appeal is moot because the injunctive target has been completed	Mootness doctrine applies; reversal of denial would not prevent the already-completed harm
Whether the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception saves the appeal from mootness	Plaintiffs contended the issue could recur and thus evade review	Defendants argued the underlying suit remains pending and the exception does not apply to this interlocutory posture	Exception does not apply: certification occurred, underlying claims remain pending, and the circumstances are not exceptional enough to avoid mootness
Whether plaintiffs could obtain decertification via their preliminary-injunction request	Plaintiffs urged that their preliminary request implicitly included decertification and other relief	Defendants emphasized the motion sought to enjoin the ongoing election and certification, not to decertify after certification	Court rejected that escape: motion’s clear terms sought to block the election/certification; decertification request does not save the appeal from mootness

Key Cases Cited

Bacon v. Neer, 631 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2011) (appeal of denial of preliminary injunction becomes moot if the act sought to be enjoined has occurred)
Minn. Humane Soc’y v. Clark, 184 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1999) (mootness doctrine and exception analysis)
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (purpose of preliminary injunction is to preserve positions until trial)
CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 618 (1st Cir. 1995) (appellate rationale on interim injunctive relief and mootness)
Indep. Party of Richmond Cty. v. Graham, 413 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2005) (interlocutory appeals of preliminary injunctions moot when the underlying event has passed)
Operation King’s Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (election-related injunctive claims moot after election and constitutional change)
Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012) (courts reluctant to void elections via preliminary equitable relief absent final relief)
Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 762 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2014) (motions must be read on their clear terms; plaintiffs cannot evade mootness by broadly requesting "all other just and proper relief")
Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442 (10th Cir. 2015) (application of capable-of-repetition exception can turn on case posture)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception applies only in exceptional situations)
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (formulation of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review doctrine)
Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2012) (examples of inherently limited-duration controversies that may invoke the exception)
Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2014) (ripeness/mootness distinctions where an election was not yet impending)