10 Cal. App. 5th 1198
Cal. Ct. App.2017Background
- Plaintiff Belinda Wilkins Tepper, daughter of 88‑year‑old Eileen Wilkins, sued Eileen’s three children (Geoffrey, Martha, Derek) alleging they misappropriated or mismanaged Eileen’s assets and committed elder financial abuse while serving as co‑trustees of Eileen’s revocable living trust. Tepper was not a trustee.
- Tepper initially sued on behalf of Eileen but did not allege she was personally aggrieved or a conservator/attorney‑in‑fact; she sought damages payable to Eileen or Eileen’s trust and attorney fees.
- Eileen, represented by separate counsel, moved to intervene and filed a complaint in intervention arguing she was the real party in interest and Tepper lacked standing.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings/demurred, asserting Tepper lacked standing; the trial court granted leave to amend, Tepper filed a first amended complaint repeating elder abuse allegations and asserting Eileen lacked capacity to understand her finances.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding Tepper had no statutory standing to pursue the elder abuse claim on Eileen’s behalf because she was neither the elder nor a statutory “personal representative”; judgment entered for defendants and Tepper appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tepper (daughter, non‑trustee) has standing to bring elder‑abuse claim on behalf of living elder | Tepper: as an "interested person"/child she may protect elder under Welf. & Inst. Code §15600(j) and Probate Code §48; alleged elder lacks capacity so suit is necessary | Defendants: Standing limited to the real party in interest (the elder) or the elder’s personal representative (conservator, trustee, or attorney‑in‑fact); Tepper is neither and has no property interest in revocable trust | Court: Tepper lacks standing; action belongs to Eileen or a statutory personal representative; demurrer properly sustained without leave to amend |
| Whether Probate Code §48 and §15600(j) jointly confer standing on any “interested person” (e.g., a child) to sue for elder abuse while elder is alive | Tepper: section 15600(j) intended to enable interested persons to engage counsel to protect elders; combined with Probate Code §48, this allows her to sue | Defendants: §15600(j) is a legislative purpose statement and does not expand the Act’s standing provisions; Probate Code §48 requires a property interest and pertains to decedent proceedings | Court: Rejected Tepper’s reading; statute does not authorize a child without a property interest or personal‑representative status to sue on elder’s behalf during elder’s lifetime |
| Whether allegations that elder lacks capacity suffice to give Tepper standing absent appointment as conservator/attorney‑in‑fact or guardian ad litem | Tepper: elder’s deposition shows lack of understanding; conservatorship would be unnecessary and invasive | Defendants: Capacity allegations do not substitute for statutory status; remedies exist (conservatorship, guardian ad litem, or obtaining power of attorney) | Court: Capacity allegations alone are insufficient; Tepper must proceed by statutory mechanisms (conservatorship, guardian ad litem, or be appointed personal representative) |
| Whether Estate of Giraldin supports Tepper’s standing theory | Tepper: Giraldin indicates courts favor remedies to protect elders and suggests potential elder‑abuse claims | Defendants: Giraldin pertains to beneficiaries’ standing after settlor’s death against trustee; it does not expand standing during settlor’s lifetime | Court: Giraldin does not support Tepper; it affirms beneficiaries may sue after settlor’s death but does not permit third‑party suits over a living, competent settlor’s objections |
Key Cases Cited
- Delaney v. Baker, 20 Cal.4th 23 (1999) (discusses purpose of the Elder Abuse Act to protect vulnerable elders)
- Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 771 (2004) (explains remedies and standing provisions added to Elder Abuse Act)
- Estate of Giraldin, 55 Cal.4th 1058 (2012) (holds beneficiaries may sue after settlor’s death for trustee breaches affecting settlor during lifetime; does not expand standing while settlor is alive)
- Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.4th 1298 (2010) (clarifies beneficiaries’ interests in revocable trusts are merely potential and can be revoked by settlor)
- Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 1024 (2009) (standing is a threshold element and may justify sustaining demurrer without leave to amend)