53 F.4th 406
6th Cir.2022Background
- Tennessee enacted H.B. 1079 (May 2019), imposing registration, training, sworn-statement, and return-deadline requirements on voter-registration drives, with misdemeanor penalties for noncompliance.
- Two plaintiff groups filed separate suits challenging the law as First Amendment burdens and unconstitutionally vague; they sought declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.
- After full briefing and evidence, the district court granted a preliminary injunction (42-page memorandum) enjoining enforcement of the challenged provisions; defendants did not appeal.
- Seven months later the Tennessee legislature repealed the challenged provisions, mooting the case; the parties dismissed the suits without prejudice.
- Plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the district court awarded fees (reduced for rate and billing issues). Defendants appealed only the prevailing-party determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs were "prevailing parties" under § 1988 after a preliminary injunction that was later mooted by state repeal | The injunction was a court-ordered, material change to defendants’ behavior that allowed plaintiffs to conduct registration drives for seven months; injunction was never vacated, so plaintiffs prevailed | The relief was temporary and was nullified by the State’s voluntary repeal; Buckhannon forbids awarding fees where defendant’s voluntary change, not a judicial decision on the merits, produced the result | Majority: Affirmed prevailing-party status—injunction was enduring enough (practical, court-ordered relief not undone); award of fees affirmed. Dissent: Would deny fees under Buckhannon/McQueary framework. |
| Whether Buckhannon’s prohibition on the "catalyst theory" bars fees when a state voluntarily repeals a statute after a preliminary injunction | The repeal does not strip prevailing status when the injunction produced a judicial imprimatur and effectively resolved district-court litigation | Buckhannon bars fees where the defendant’s voluntary repeal, not a final judicial determination, produced the change in legal relationship | Majority: Buckhannon did not preclude fees here because the injunction created a material, not-undone change; relied on similarity to Green Party and Miller. Dissent: Buckhannon + McQueary require denying fees when state voluntarily moots case. |
| Whether a preliminary injunction can be "enduring" enough for § 1988 purposes when no final merits judgment was entered | The injunction here was the practical end of district litigation (detailed merits analysis, no reversal), providing irrevocable benefits (registrations) for the election cycle | Plaintiffs only obtained preliminary (not permanent) relief and did not receive the full relief sought (permanent injunction/merits decision) | Majority: A preliminary injunction can suffice where it practically concludes district-court litigation and is not vacated; the relief here was sufficiently enduring. Dissent: Under McQueary I/II, preliminary relief that stops short of permanent relief usually does not justify fees; plaintiffs did not obtain everything they sought. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejects "catalyst theory"; voluntary defendant action lacks judicial imprimatur for prevailing-party status)
- Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (preliminary injunctive relief cannot support prevailing-party status if later reversed or undone)
- McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2010) (McQueary I) (sets framework for awarding fees after preliminary injunctions; generally disfavors fees unless relief is material and enduring)
- McQueary v. Conway, [citation="508 F. App'x 522"] (6th Cir. 2012) (McQueary II) (applies McQueary I to deny fees where state repeal mooted case after a preliminary injunction)
- Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 767 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs who obtained district-court relief before intervening legislative change can still be prevailing parties for district-court fees)
- Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2019) (preliminary injunction producing irrevocable one-time benefits can support prevailing-party status)
- Tenn. State Conference of NAACP v. Hargett, 420 F. Supp. 3d 683 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (district-court opinion granting the preliminary injunction; analyzed burdens and vagueness)