3:23-cv-00619
N.D. Cal.Aug 1, 2024Background:
- Plaintiff Juan Manuel Tejeda worked for CalMat (a Vulcan subsidiary) from 2017 to May 12, 2022; his job was reclassified to "Driver – Mobile Sweeper" in Nov. 2020 but he occasionally worked as a ready‑mix driver.
- Tejeda was represented as a union employee under a Teamsters CBA (Local 665) for the relevant period; payroll records reflect union rates and contributions.
- Complaint (claims limited to conduct from Feb. 12, 2022 forward) alleges: improper quarter‑hour rounding/minimum wage underpayment, missed/short meal periods, missed rest breaks, and derivative wage‑statement, waiting‑time, and payday claims on behalf of putative classes.
- Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing federal preemption under LMRA §301 (Burnside two‑step), and FMSCA HOS regulations; it also argued exemptions under Cal. Lab. Code §512 and Wage Order 16 and invoked the CBA grievance procedure.
- Plaintiff conceded meal/rest claims attributable to ready‑mix driving and limited those claims to his mobile‑sweeper work; he argued rounding violates California law (Camp/Donohue/Troester line) and that the mobile‑sweeper work is not covered by the §512 or Wage Order 16 exemptions.
- The court found the Local 665 CBA covered Tejeda’s mobile‑sweeper work, dismissed meal/rest claims to the extent tied to ready‑mix driving, but otherwise denied summary judgment (i.e., rejected LMRA and HOS preemption as to remaining claims).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LMRA §301 preempts the minimum‑wage claim based on quarter‑hour rounding | Tejeda: minimum‑wage right is non‑waivable; rounding is unlawful under Camp/Donohue/Troester when exact minutes are captured | CalMat: claim substantially depends on interpreting CBA rounding terms (start/quit) so §301 preempts | Not preempted — court follows Camp line; even if rounding permitted, resolving the claim doesn't require interpreting ambiguous CBA terms |
| Whether LMRA §301 preempts the meal‑period claim | Tejeda: limited claim to mobile‑sweeper work; On‑Duty Meal Agreement applies only to ready‑mix work; meal rights are state law non‑waivable rights | CalMat: meal‑period entitlement flows from CBA (or CBA waiver); On‑Duty Agreement and CBA require interpretation → §301 preempts; alternatively, §512 exemptions apply | Not preempted for mobile‑sweeper work; meal/rest claims dismissed with prejudice only as to ready‑mix driving (plaintiff conceded) |
| Whether mobile‑sweeper work is exempt from meal periods as a “commercial driver” or “construction occupation” (Lab. Code §512 / Wage Order 16) | Tejeda: mobile‑sweeper role is covered by Wage Order 1 (manufacturing); employer’s job description alone is insufficient to prove a statutory commercial‑driver or construction occupation exemption | CalMat: mobile sweepers require a commercial license and operate in construction‑related contexts; Wage Order 16 and §512 exemptions apply | Defendant failed to meet burden; summary judgment denied on exemption grounds — evidence did not show statutory licensing/coverage or that Wage Order 16 applied |
| Whether rest‑break claim is preempted or exempt because CBA/Wage Order 16 provides equivalent protections | Tejeda: rest breaks governed by Wage Order 1 and §226.7; no Wage Order 16 exemption applies to his mobile‑sweeper work | CalMat: Wage Order 16 (and CBA equivalent protections) exempt these claims and §301 preempts | Not preempted for mobile‑sweeper work — Wage Order 16 inapplicable on the record, so rest‑break claim survives as to mobile‑sweeper work |
| Procedural objections: narrowing claims and new reply evidence | Tejeda: narrowing is proper at summary judgment; objected to new Reply evidence but asked for chance to respond | CalMat: Plaintiff may not narrow allegations; Reply may introduce new evidence rebutting Plaintiff’s new theory | Court: narrowing claims was permissible; court allowed consideration of new Reply evidence but gave Plaintiff an opportunity to respond (objection overruled) |
Key Cases Cited
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (two‑step test for LMRA §301 preemption)
- Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (statutory exemptions can make rights depend on a CBA for preemption purposes)
- Camp v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 84 Cal. App. 5th 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (quarter‑hour rounding impermissible when employer captures exact minutes; employer must pay all time worked)
- Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 5 Cal.5th 829 (Cal. 2018) (rejected federal de minimis doctrine under California law)
- Donohue v. AMN Servs., LLC, 11 Cal.5th 58 (Cal. 2021) (rounding unlawful in meal–period context; technology affects rounding justification)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1988) (state‑law causes of action may be preempted where resolution requires interpretation of a CBA)
- Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2005) (non‑waivable state rights limit preemption where CBA interpretation is unnecessary)