63 F.4th 323
5th Cir.2023Background
- Tejas Motel (owned by Tejas Motel, L.L.C.) operated since ~1970; purchased by appellant in 2006 and was classified as a nonconforming use after Mesquite tightened hotel/motel zoning in 1997 and again in 2008.
- In 2018 the City revised its amortization process and the Board held hearings, then ordered Tejas to either comply with zoning or cease operations by May 1, 2019.
- Tejas sued in Texas state court asserting state- and federal-constitutional takings claims; the trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed.
- The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed: Tejas’s state claim was untimely (procedurally barred) and its federal takings claim was not viable; the Texas Supreme Court denied review and mandate issued.
- Tejas then filed the same federal §1983 takings claim in federal court; the district court (after correcting an initial Rooker–Feldman ruling) dismissed the federal suit as barred by res judicata; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the prior Texas-court judgment precludes identical federal takings litigation (res judicata / claim preclusion) | Tejas: state judgment was not a final, merits disposition as to the federal claim, so res judicata does not bar federal suit | City: Texas appellate mandate issued a final, on-the-merits judgment as to Tejas’s claims against the City, so res judicata bars relitigation | Held: Preclusion applies — state judgment was final, on the merits, and by a competent court, so federal claim is barred |
| Whether the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the federal takings claim was unripe under Williamson County when Tejas first sued | Tejas: under Williamson (then-good law) federal claim was unripe and Texas never could adjudicate it (time-barred), so state court lacked jurisdiction and its judgment is non-preclusive | City: By the time the appellate judgment issued Knick had overruled Williamson; Texas law also allowed federal claims to ripen during suit, so the state court had jurisdiction | Held: State court had jurisdiction; the federal claim was ripe by the time of the appellate decision and/or ripened during the state suit, so preclusion is proper |
| Whether Knick’s overruling of Williamson prevents application of res judicata to pre-Knick state-court judgments | Tejas: Knick changed takings procedure and creates an intervening change in decisional law, so pre-Knick dismissal should not preclude a federal suit | City: Knick does not change substantive takings law or San Remo’s preclusion rule; Knick was controlling by the time of the appellate judgment | Held: Knick does not negate res judicata here; it did not alter the merits test for takings and San Remo remains good law regarding preclusive effect |
| Whether the state-court dismissal was final and on the merits (including effect of plea to the jurisdiction / sovereign immunity) | Tejas: trial-court order was ambiguous and other filings (intervention, amended pleadings, new‑trial motion) left issues unresolved, so no final on-the-merits judgment as to all rights | City: The plea-based dismissal (upheld on appeal) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction as to Tejas’s claims against the City and functions as a dismissal with prejudice; any remaining filings did not disturb finality as to the City | Held: Dismissal was final and on the merits as to Tejas vs. City (so preclusive); remaining state-court filings do not change the res judicata effect |
Key Cases Cited
- Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (overruled Williamson’s state-litigation ripeness requirement, allowing immediate federal §1983 takings claims)
- San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (state-court adjudications of federal takings claims can have preclusive effect in federal court)
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (established the prior state-litigation ripeness requirement for regulatory takings)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (governing multi-factor test for regulatory takings analysis)
- Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513 (2013) (clarified Williamson’s prudential, not jurisdictional, aspects)
- Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1991) (Texas rule: dismissal based on sovereign immunity is treated as dismissal with prejudice for res judicata purposes)