967 F.3d 741
8th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs Teddy and Melanie Scott sued Dyno Nobel, Inc. after a startup at Dyno’s nitric acid plant released a NOx (nitrogen oxides) cloud that traveled from Dyno’s 108-foot exhaust stack and enveloped workers at the neighboring Calumet facility, injuring Teddy Scott.
- NOx (especially nitrogen dioxide) is acutely toxic, denser than air at higher concentrations, and Dyno maintained chemical safety information and startup protocols (timing, wind monitoring, emergency plans) to limit exposure.
- On March 20, 2015 Dyno began a morning startup; after a failed early attempt, it restarted during Calumet working hours and a dark NOx plume descended and was blown onto Calumet; Dyno does not dispute its emissions reached Calumet for purposes of the appeal.
- Dyno moved for summary judgment arguing it owed no legal duty because the kind of ground-level, undispersed plume that injured Scott was not foreseeable (Dyno relied on long operation without prior similar injuries).
- The district court granted summary judgment, concluding under Missouri law Dyno owed Scott no duty because the injury was not foreseeable.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that foreseeability—when varying inferences are possible—is a jury question and that the summary judgment record contained evidence from which a reasonable jury could find foreseeability (stack temps, failed purge, weather, plume density, and notice/monitoring disputes).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dyno owed a duty to Scott based on foreseeability of harm from startup emissions | Scott: NOx emissions presented a sufficient probability of harm (density, toxicity, startup conditions, weather, lack of purge/notice) to create duty | Dyno: No history of prior injuries or plumes behaving this way; injury was not reasonably foreseeable so no duty | Reversed: Jury question — reasonable jurors could find some probability of serious harm and thus duty; not appropriate for summary judgment |
| Who decides foreseeability (judge vs. jury) | Scott: Foreseeability is factual and, where inferences vary, should be decided by the jury | Dyno: Court can decide foreseeability as a matter of law | Eighth Circuit: Under Missouri precedent, when varying inferences are possible foreseeability is for the jury; only where evidence permits a single reasonable finding may the court decide |
| Discovery sanctions and 30(b)(6) deposition (failure-to-compel / sanctions) | Scott: District court abused discretion by denying discovery relief and failing to compel witness; sanctions were warranted | Dyno: Discovery rulings moot because summary judgment was proper | Held: Court declined to address interlocutory discovery rulings on remand and did not rule on sanctions at this stage |
| Alternative grounds for affirming summary judgment (no admissible expert on standard of care/causation) | Scott: Expert evidence and record support causation and standard of care issues for trial | Dyno: No admissible expert established standard of care or causation, so summary judgment should be affirmed | Held: Court declined to resolve these alternative merits issues on interlocutory appeal and remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. 2000) (foreseeability as part of duty; jury may decide foreseeability when inferences vary)
- Pierce v. Platte-Clay Elec. Coop. Inc., 769 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1989) (foreseeability for duty; jury can weigh evidence on foreseeability)
- Alcorn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 50 S.W.3d 226 (Mo. 2001) (duty analysis asks whether defendant should have foreseen risk to class of persons)
- Komeshak v. Missouri Petroleum Products Co., 314 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1958) (older articulation requiring a probability of occurrence; addressed and discussed by later Missouri precedent)
- Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (classic formulation: the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty; range of reasonable apprehension may be for court or jury)