Tedde R. Blunck v. Cathy A. Blunck, 03-15-00128-CV

Background

Appellee Cathy Blunck obtained a judgment against Appellant Tedde Blunck in October 2012 and filed a post‑judgment motion for turnover/receivership under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 31.002 in January 2015.
A hearing was held on February 9, 2015; Appellant received notice but did not attend. The trial court granted turnover relief and appointed a receiver.
The trial court took judicial notice of the Final Decree of Divorce awarding Appellant various intangible and hard‑to‑levy assets (timeshares, bank accounts, accounts receivable, insurance, securities/plan interests, notes receivable, law practice revenue, certain real property).
Appellee also introduced (1) a certified copy of the Tedde R. Blunck Living Trust (showing contract rights) and (2) Appellant’s bankruptcy schedules (signed under penalty of perjury and bearing the Bankruptcy Court’s electronic stamp) as evidence of owned non‑exempt, non‑attachable assets.
Appellant challenged the sufficiency/authenticity of evidence, alleged the turnover order was defective for not identifying specific property, and attacked the court’s establishment of the receiver’s fee rate.
Appellee argues § 31.002(h) permits a turnover order without listing specific items, the offered documents were self‑authenticating, and setting a receiver’s hourly rate is distinct from approving payment of fees.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Blunck)	Defendant's Argument (T. Blunck)	Held
1. Sufficiency of evidence for turnover order	Judicial notice of the divorce decree plus certified trust and bankruptcy schedules provide probative evidence that debtor owns nonexempt property not readily attachable	No competent evidence; exhibits are unauthenticated or insufficient	Court: No abuse of discretion — some competent evidence supported turnover; judicial notice + self‑authenticating exhibits suffice under §31.002 and precedent
2. Requirement to identify specific property in turnover order	§31.002(h) expressly allows turnover orders that do not identify specific property; prior case law requiring specificity has been superseded by statute	Order invalid for failing to state specifically what non‑exempt property must be turned over	Court: No abuse — statute permits non‑specific turnover orders
3. Court setting receiver’s compensation rate in turnover order	Setting the customary/hourly rate is permissible and not a pre‑approval of fees; receiver must later petition for payment and Appellant can contest reasonableness then	Court improperly pre‑approved receiver compensation amount	Court: No abuse — establishing a rate is not final approval of fees; payment requires later court review
4. Authentication of documentary evidence (trust, bankruptcy schedules)	Certified trust copy and electronically stamped bankruptcy filings are self‑authenticating under Tex. R. Evid. 902 (and/or 901) and admissible	Documents alleged unauthenticated and unreliable	Court: Documents were properly authenticated/self‑authenticating; evidence admissible and probative

Key Cases Cited

Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991) (turnover orders reviewed for abuse of discretion; lack of evidence relevant to that review)
Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) (§31.002 does not prescribe form or quantum of evidence; trial court must have some evidence; §31.002(h) discussed)
Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. R&G Produce Co., 443 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2014) (documents printed from government websites or bearing court stamps can be self‑authenticating)
Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, 810 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1991) (turnover statute requires factual showing that debtor has nonexempt property not readily subject to execution)
Clayton v. Wisener, 169 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App. — Tyler 2005) (turnover order cannot issue without evidence of elements required by §31.002)