Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630

Joshua Teague pled guilty in 2008 and was placed on Pretrial Diversion for fraudulent use of a credit card (amount $280), a felony under the law at that time.
While Teague was on diversion, KRS 434.650 was amended (June 25, 2009) to make credit-card offenses $500 and under misdemeanors.
Teague failed to complete diversion; the Commonwealth moved to revoke, and on March 24, 2010 he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal.
In October 2011 Teague filed an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence, arguing he should have been sentenced under the amended statute (a misdemeanor) and that counsel was ineffective for not requesting application of the new law.
The trial court denied the RCr 11.42 motion; the appellate court considered the case after Smith v. Commonwealth became final and affirmed the denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Teague should have been sentenced under the post-amendment KRS 434.650	Teague: the amended statute mitigated punishment and applied at his 2010 sentencing; counsel was ineffective for not requesting its application	Commonwealth: sentencing followed existing law and Teague’s claim should have been raised on direct appeal; counsel’s omission was not deficient given unsettled law	Court: Counsel not ineffective; given unsettled precedent at sentencing, failure to request new-law sentencing was not error and claim should have been raised on direct appeal; affirm denial of RCr 11.42 motion
Whether Smith requires retroactive application of the amended statute to Teague	Teague: Smith analogous because sentencing occurred after amendment, so new law should control	Commonwealth: factual and procedural differences and unsettled law at the time meant counsel’s omission was reasonable	Court: Smith was not dispositive here because Smith’s circumstances differed and the controlling law was unsettled at sentencing; Teague’s claim could have been raised on direct appeal

Smith v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 742 (Ky. 2013) (held that when sentencing occurs after a law mitigating punishment takes effect, the defendant may seek application of the new law)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (established two-prong ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998) (RCr 11.42 is limited to issues not and could not have been raised on direct appeal)
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001) (counsel performance judged by reasonableness under professional norms)