TD Equities, Inc. v. Cribbs
2025 NY Slip Op 50775(U)
Civ. Ct. NYC, Queens Cty.2025Background
- TD Equities, Inc. served a 90-day lease termination notice on Kimberly Cribbs, set to expire on June 5, 2024, via conspicuous place service ("nail and mail").
- The termination notice was for a “no-grounds” holdover, referencing then-applicable law (RPL § 226-c), and contained no allegations of nuisance or cause.
- On April 20, 2024, the Good Cause Eviction Law (GCEL) went into effect, limiting "no-grounds" evictions for covered dwellings unless a statutory “good cause” exists.
- Both parties agreed the premises are covered by GCEL, but the landlord alleged a "nuisance" exception in the petition, filed after GCEL's enactment.
- Cribbs (respondent) moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including inadequate notice, improper service, rent acceptance (“vitiation”), and legal sufficiency of the petition.
- The main issue became whether the petition and pre-GCEL notice, lacking facts about alleged nuisance, satisfied statutory pleading requirements under RPAPL § 741(4).
Issues
| Issue | TD Equities' Argument | Cribbs' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Service of Termination Notice | Service was proper; denial of receipt is conclusory. | Service was improper; respondent was home and did not receive notice. | Service was sufficient; respondent's affidavits were not specific or substantiated. |
| Vitiation (rent acceptance) | Acceptance of one unsolicited, third-party payment does not vitiate notice. | Acceptance of rent between termination and petition vitiates/voids notice. | No vitiation; waiver/intent not proven by single, unsolicited payment. |
| Notice Must Expire End of Month | Statute now allows expiration on any day with proper notice. | Notice must expire at end of a calendar month for month-to-month tenancy. | Dismissed; plain statutory language now allows any specified day. |
| Sufficiency of Notice and Petition under GCEL | Petition can rely on pre-GCEL “no-grounds” notice; GCEL not retroactive; incorporation by reference suffices. | Petition lacks factual allegations of nuisance; cannot simply incorporate fact-free notice; violates RPAPL § 741(4). | Granted; petition fails to state material facts to allow defense. Case dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 (N.Y. 1994) (standard for motion to dismiss: pleadings liberally construed, facts deemed true)
- Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 (N.Y. 1977) (focus on whether cause of action exists, not form)
- 148 S. Emerson Partners, LLC v 148 S. Emerson Assocs., LLC, 157 AD3d 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2018) (petitions must provide adequate factual notice to frame a defense)
- Overton v Town of Southampton, 50 AD3d 1112 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2008) (unambiguous statutory language must be applied as written)
- City of New York v State, 40 NY2d 659 (N.Y. 1976) (waiver requires intentional and unequivocal conduct)