Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 478 B.R. 419

Divorced couple entered a comprehensive Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA).
Virginia court ordered Matthew Taylor to pay Eloísa spousal support for 10 years or until remarriage.
Eloísa cohabited; Virginia court terminated support and ordered Eloísa to refund $40,660.59 and pay $10,000 in Matthew’s fees.
Eloísa filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy; Matthew filed an adversary proceeding to except the debt from discharge.
Bankruptcy court dismissed fraud and DSO claims, granted summary judgment under § 523(a)(15), and did not address fees.
Appellate court affirms § 523(a)(5) dismissal, § 523(a)(15) discharge exception, and fee-denial, and remands not necessary.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether overpaid spousal support debt is a DSO	Taylor argued overpayment remains DSO despite overpayment.	Taylor contends debt should be treated as non-DSO if not in nature of support at rise.	Not a DSO under § 523(a)(5); overpayment debt not in the nature of support.
Whether debt is excepted under § 523(a)(15)	Debt arose from a divorce/separation context; should be non-dischargeable.	Plain language of § 523(a)(15) covers debts incurred in connection with divorce orders; should apply.	Debt excepted under § 523(a)(15) as incurred in connection with a separation/divorce order.
Whether MSA fee-shifting provisions authorize fee awards	MSA provisions allow attorney’s fees for enforcing rights under agreement.	MSA provisions do not authorize fees in bankruptcy/adversary context absent explicit language.	MSA fee-shifting provisions do not authorize fees in this bankruptcy/adversary context.

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (standards for dischargeability and burden of proof)
Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1993) (two-part test for § 523(a)(5): intent and substance of obligation)
In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1998) (DSO construction: liberality in § 523(a)(5) interpretations)