Taylor v. State
428 Md. 386
| Md. | 2012Background
- Taylor was indicted for distributing and possessing a controlled dangerous substance in Dorchester County (2005).
- Robinson represented Taylor in that case and another pending case, under a flat $6,000 fee; payment terms included weekly installments.
- Robinson filed a civil suit against Taylor and his girlfriend for unpaid fees about a week before trial and never disclosed the conflict to the court.
- During trial, Robinson sought to call Anderson as an alibi witness; the court denied due to late disclosure.
- Taylor was convicted of both counts; postconviction relief was granted on ineffective assistance grounds due to the alleged conflict.
- The postconviction court treated the conflict under MLPRC 1.7 as automatically violating the constitutional right, prompting appellate remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sullivan applies to attorney conflicts of interest beyond joint representation | Taylor contends Sullivan presumes prejudice for any actual conflict created by counsel. | State argues Sullivan is narrow and limited to concurrent joint representations. | Sullivan applies to personal conflicts, requiring adverse effect to prejudice rebutting Strickland. |
| Whether actual adverse effect must be shown to trigger Sullivan prejudice beyond mere conflict | Taylor asserts proof of effect is not required under Sullivan when conflict exists. | State maintains prejudice must be shown or presumed only where the conflict adversely affects performance. | Taylor must show actual adverse effect or rely on Mickens three-prong test on remand. |
| Whether remand is necessary to develop the record under Mickens three-prong test | Taylor seeks remand to prove lack of confidence and adverse effect from conflict. | State argues no further development is necessary to deny prejudice. | Remand is required to apply Mickens three-part test to determine adverse effect. |
| Whether Robinson's personal conflict under MLRPC 1.7 violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right | Taylor asserts the conflict tainted representation and created distrust, affecting defense. | State contends ethical violation alone does not prove constitutional prejudice. | Sullivan approach applies; need record-specific showing of adverse effect; remand required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for effective assistance of counsel; prejudice prong may be waived by actual conflict)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (presumption of prejudice when counsel has an actual conflict)
- Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (U.S. 1942) (timely conflict prompts inquiry; automatic reversal if trial court fails to address conflict)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1978) (conflict of interest in consolidated representation; automatic reversal absent timely inquiry)
- Sullivan v. Beary? (Sullivan), 446 U.S. 343 (U.S. 1980) (conflict must adversely affect performance unless case falls under Glasser/Holloway)
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2002) (adverse effect required; three-prong test for potential conflicts and prejudice when no inquiry duty)
- Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26 (Md. 2000) (recognizes dual representation conflict; scope of Sullivan vs. Glasser/Holloway lines)
- Duvall v. State, 399 Md. 210 (Md. 2007) (extends conflict analysis to non-common defendant conflicts; discusses Mickens framework)
- Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1981) (probation-conflict context; inquiry duty when conflict is apparent)