Taylor v. State
76 A.3d 791
| Del. | 2013Background
- Two rival Wilmington groups—the TrapStars (a rap group that became a drug‑selling gang) and Pope’s Group (a Latin Kings subset)—engaged in escalating violence in 2009–2010, including multiple shootings and at least one murder.
- Marc Taylor and Kevin Rasin, TrapStars members, were indicted on numerous felonies including illegal gang participation under 11 Del. C. § 616, murder, attempted murder, weapons, and drug offenses. Several co‑defendants pleaded guilty; Taylor and Rasin were tried.
- Taylor was convicted on most counts (acquitted on some lesser charges); Rasin was convicted on all but two counts. Both appealed.
- Central statutory provision: 11 Del. C. § 616(b) (illegal gang participation) requires (1) active participation in a criminal street gang, (2) knowledge that the gang engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity (defined in § 616(a)(2)), and (3) knowingly promoting, furthering, or assisting felony criminal conduct by the gang.
- On appeal the defendants raised constitutional challenges to § 616 (vagueness and overbreadth/freedom of association) and various trial‑level evidentiary and joinder/severance claims. The Superior Court convictions were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness of phrase “actively participates” in § 616 | Taylor/Rasin: term is undefined; ordinary person cannot know when passive becomes criminal ‘‘active’’ participation | Statute does not define term — challenge that it invites arbitrary enforcement and fails notice | Court: term is not unconstitutionally vague; common‑sense meaning (more than nominal/passive involvement) suffices; additional elements (knowledge of pattern; knowingly assisting felony) limit overbreadth/arbitrariness — upheld |
| Conflict between § 616(a)(2) "pattern of criminal activity" and § 616(b) "any criminal conduct" | Taylor: definitions conflict and create vagueness | Statute’s two phrases govern different elements (pattern requirement vs. any felony the gang commits) | Court: no conflict; provisions address separate elements; not vague |
| Overbreadth / freedom of association | Taylor/Rasin: § 616 chills protected association; sweeps in lawful conduct | Statute punishes active assistance of criminal conduct, not mere association | Court: statute is not overbroad; freedom to associate does not protect joining to further criminal activity |
| Sufficiency of evidence (Taylor) | Taylor: insufficient proof he actively participated or that TrapStars’ primary activity was enumerated crimes | Evidence of drug sales, firearms procurement/possession, presence during violent acts, and use of a traphouse showed active participation and that criminal activity was a primary activity | Court: evidence sufficient for jury verdict |
| Admissibility of hearsay (present sense impression) (Taylor) | Taylor: statement by neighborhood boy (Maleek) implicating “Gunner” was inadmissible hearsay and unreliable | Prosecution: statement was a present sense impression admitted through witness who heard it shortly after the shooting; credibility is for the jury | Court: admission proper under present sense impression exception; jury weighs credibility |
| Severance and admission of prior bad acts / gang evidence (Rasin) | Rasin: joinder with gang participation unfairly prejudicial; prior bad‑acts and drug evidence would be barred in separate trial | State: same evidence relevant to motive, gang existence, and would be admissible even if counts severed; evidence inextricably intertwined | Court: denial of severance not an abuse of discretion; evidence admissible and probative |
| Admission of rap video (Rasin) | Rasin: rap song was prejudicial character/propensity evidence | State: video (performed by co‑defendant) relevant to gang identity and animus; admitted under co‑conspirator exception and tested under Getz balancing | Court: trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting video |
| Admission of DNA expert testimony (Rasin) | Rasin: DNA results were inconclusive and speculative; should have been excluded | State: results showed multiple handlers, excluded other suspects, and were probative of shared weapon use | Court: expert testimony admissible and probative; no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Castenada, 23 Cal.4th 743 (Cal. 2000) (‘‘active participation’’ means more than nominal or passive membership; statute not vague)
- Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (U.S. 1961) (distinction between active and nominal membership relevant to association/criminal liability)
- Wien v. State, 882 A.2d 183 (Del. 2005) (vagueness/notice principle for statutory construction)
- Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246 (Del. 2001) (present sense impression hearsay analysis)
- Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988) (test for admissibility/balancing of prejudicial versus probative evidence)