Taylor v. State
122 So. 3d 707
Miss.2013Background
- Carlos Taylor was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in a prison facility; at a subsequent bifurcated habitual-offender hearing the State sought sentencing under Miss. Code § 99-19-83 (life without parole).
- The State introduced certified prior-conviction records showing two separate felony convictions: sale of marijuana (3 years) and a conviction described as “sexual intercourse with a child under age” (6 years); Taylor did not contest these records at the hearing.
- The trial court found one prior felony was a crime of violence and sentenced Taylor as a violent habitual offender to life without parole; post-trial motions and appeal followed.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; this Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Taylor’s prior conviction for sexual intercourse with an underage child is a per se "crime of violence" for § 99-19-83 purposes.
- The Court obtained the full pen pack, confirmed the prior conviction charged sexual intercourse with a child under 14, and held that such conviction is a crime of violence; thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved elements required for habitual-offender sentencing under § 99-19-83 | State failed to prove a prior conviction that is a "crime of violence"; records were vague | Certified indictments and sentencing orders sufficiently proved prior convictions and service of sentences | Held: State introduced competent, uncontradicted proof; requirements satisfied |
| Whether "sexual intercourse with a child under age" is per se a "crime of violence" for § 99-19-83 | The sex offense does not necessarily show a violent act; record did not identify statute or elements | Sex with an underage child is inherently forceful because the law deems a child incapable of consent; precedent treats sex crimes against children as violent | Held: Such convictions are crimes of violence; trial court correctly labeled prior conviction violent |
| Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing life without parole | Sentence is grossly disproportionate and unconstitutional (cruel and unusual) | Sentence authorized under habitual-offender statute given proven violent prior conviction | Held: No abuse of discretion; sentence affirmed |
| Whether dicta in prior cases (e.g., Hughes) controls the question | Hughes’ remark suggests some statutory-rape convictions might be nonviolent | Hughes’ language was dicta and not controlling; other line of Mississippi cases treat child sex crimes as violent | Held: Hughes’ dicta is not controlling; existing precedent supports categorizing child-sex convictions as violent |
Key Cases Cited
- Bandy v. State, 495 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1986) (sets standard for proving habitual-offender status and treats sex crimes against children under a separate violence standard)
- McQueen v. State, 473 So.2d 971 (Miss. 1985) (rejects vagueness challenge to "crime of violence" and defines "violence" broadly)
- Long v. State, 52 So.3d 1188 (Miss. 2011) (recognizes inherent psychological harm and per se violent nature of certain child-sex offenses)
- Hughes v. State, 892 So.2d 203 (Miss. 2004) (prior opinion containing dicta about nonviolent statutory-rape instances; Court here treats that language as non-binding)
- Brown v. State, 102 So.3d 1087 (Miss. 2012) (explains caution in labeling crimes "violent" absent clear statutory command; Court distinguishes Brown from this case)