Taylor v. State
2D15-3249
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | May 26, 2017Background
- Defendant Ulysses Taylor was convicted by a jury of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting officers with violence arising from an August 16, 2014 arrest struggle.
- The original information named Officer Garza as the victim in the battery count, but the arrest report, depositions, injury photo, and trial evidence identified Officer Tomblin as the actual officer who was struck.
- At trial Officer Tomblin testified that Taylor intentionally struck him; Officer Garza testified he neither saw Tomblin struck nor was he struck himself.
- After the State rested, Taylor moved for judgment of acquittal contending the State failed to prove a battery on Officer Garza; the State then moved (over defense objection) to reopen and amend the information to substitute Officer Tomblin as the victim.
- The trial court granted the State leave to amend; Taylor objected but did not show how he was prejudiced; the defense presented a witness who said any touching was accidental and identified only Tomblin as the potential victim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State may amend an information midtrial to change the named victim | State: Amendment is permissible to correct misnomer where identity was known and no prejudice results | Taylor: Amendment prejudices his defense because proof at trial targeted a different named victim (Garza) | Court: Permissible if no prejudice to substantial rights; allowed amendment here because only one officer was implicated and identity was always known |
| Whether the victim's identity is an essential element requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt | State: Identity can be corrected when it is a clerical misnomer and did not mislead defense | Taylor: Victim's name is an essential element and changing it midtrial is substantive and prejudicial | Court: The name of a person victimized is an essential element, but amendment is allowed if it does not prejudice defendant's substantial rights |
| Whether amendment raised due process or double jeopardy concerns | State: No due process or double jeopardy violation because factual allegations and time/place/defendant were unchanged | Taylor: Amendment could implicate due process/double jeopardy by effectively charging a different offense | Court: No due process or double jeopardy violation on this record; no prejudice shown |
| Availability of pretrial remedies and State's responsibility to correct errors earlier | State: N/A | Taylor: N/A (defense could have filed pretrial motion to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4)) | Court: Noted defense had available pretrial remedy; State should have corrected error earlier but failure did not create reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1989) (state may amend an information during trial unless defendant shows prejudice to substantial rights)
- State v. Clements, 903 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 2005) (limits on midtrial amendments where due process or double jeopardy prejudice is shown)
- Green v. State, 728 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (midtrial amendment changing the asserted victim can be prejudicial where it effectively charges a different offense)
- Holborough v. State, 103 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (victim’s name is an essential element in crimes against persons)