Taylor v. Nissan North America, 3:16-cv-00821

Taylor, a former Nissan employee, alleges repeated workplace exposure to formaldehyde from paint-curing ovens caused seizure disorder and other injuries.
He claims Nissan knew emission levels exceeded OSHA limits, concealed or misrepresented sampling data, and repeatedly required him to work without a respirator despite medical warnings.
After initial exposure in October 2015, Taylor reported symptoms, was diagnosed with chemical exposure, and was given temporary work restrictions; Nissan later returned him to duty and allegedly sent him back into hazardous areas in August 2016.
Taylor brings intentional-tort claims: misrepresentation, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and intentional misrepresentation.
Nissan moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA) exclusivity provision bars Taylor’s claims; Nissan also argued Taylor’s fraud claims fail Rule 9(b) particularity requirements.
The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding Taylor pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly invoke the MWCA intentional-tort exception and adequately alleged fraudulent concealment under Rule 9(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether MWCA exclusivity bars Taylor's intentional-tort claims	Taylor contends his allegations plead actual intent to injure and concealment, fitting the intentional-tort exception so MWCA does not bar his claims	Nissan contends MWCA’s exclusivity precludes Taylor’s claims because alleged conduct is at most negligent/reckless and not intentionally aimed to injure	Denied dismissal: Court finds Taylor’s factual allegations plausible to support the intentional-tort exception (actual intent to injure plausibly alleged)
Whether fraud/intentional-misrepresentation claims satisfy Rule 9(b) particularity	Taylor argues he alleged Nissan knowingly withheld or misrepresented sampling data, leaks, and emission conditions—i.e., fraudulent concealment—so intent/knowledge may be pleaded generally	Nissan argues Taylor failed to identify the who/what/when/where of the alleged misrepresentations with required particularity	Denied dismissal: Court concludes Taylor sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment and pleaded intent/knowledge adequately at the pleading stage

Bowden v. Young, 120 So. 3d 971 (Miss. 2013) (articulates Mississippi intentional-tort exception to MWCA exclusivity)
Griffin v. Futorian Corp., 533 So. 2d 461 (Miss. 1988) (intentional-tort exception requires actual intent to injure)
Blailock v. O’Bannon, 795 So. 2d 533 (Miss. 2001) (mere willful or reckless conduct insufficient for intentional-tort exception)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth at pleading stage)
Davidson v. Rogers, 431 So. 2d 483 (Miss. 1983) (fraudulent concealment can arise from omissions or affirmative acts preventing discovery)
Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2008) (elements and particulars required by Rule 9(b))