Taylor v. Giant of Maryland, LLC
33 A.3d 445
Md.2011Background
- Ms. Taylor, an African American female, alleged Giant discriminated against her based on sex by forcing an independent medical examination for a gynecological condition that male drivers were not required to undergo.
- She also alleged retaliatory termination about 25 days after she filed a discrimination complaint with the Prince George's County Human Relations Commission.
- A seven-day jury trial resolved mainly in Taylor's favor on sex discrimination and retaliation, while Giant prevailed on race discrimination and damages.
- Giant Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding LMRA §301 preemption and insufficiency of evidence, and vacated fee awards.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review preemption, comparator standards, retaliation sufficiency, and appellate fees jurisdiction.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the Special Appeals’ preemption ruling, adopted a correct comparator-evidence standard, found legally sufficient evidence of retaliation, and remanded for additional proceedings on remaining issues; it also ruled the untimely attorney's-fees appeal as fatal but remanded for other issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §301 preempts the Maryland discrimination/retaliation claims | Taylor argues §301 does not preempt because claims are independent of the CBA | Giant contends preemption applies whenever the CBA is central to the case | Not preempted by §301 |
| Proper comparator evidence standard for gender-based discrimination | Taylor asserts a broader set of male comparators show disparate treatment | Giant asserts comparators must be substantially similar and share same supervisor | Correct standard applied; four male comparators sufficed under context-specific approach |
| Sufficiency of evidence for retaliatory termination | Terminate to punish protected activity; evidence shows knowledge of the discrimination claim | Term shown as legitimate safety/IME concern, not retaliation | Legally sufficient circumstantial evidence supported retaliation verdict |
| Attorney's fees appeal timing and appellate jurisdiction | Remanded issues require reviewing fee order; timely appeal wasn’t properly challenged | Untimely notice of appeal deprives appellate court of jurisdiction | Giant's untimely appeal on fees fatal; remanded for other issues; Court of Special Appeals remanded on remaining matters |
Key Cases Cited
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (LMRA preemption requires contract-interpretation dependence; not all tangential contract issues are preempted)
- Lueck v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (State tort claims preempted if they define the contract relationship's meaning)
- Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684 (1992) (State-law rights independent of the union constitution/bylaws may avoid §301 preemption)
- United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990) (§301 preemption; federal common law governs CBA disputes)
- Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008) (Contextual approach to admissibility/weight of comparator evidence in discrimination cases)
- Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 2010) (Comparator evidence may show gender discrimination when health conditions differ but treatment disparities exist)
- Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (Comparator need not be identical; substantially similar conduct and impact suffice)