Taylor v. Extendicare Apl of: Extendicare
19 WAP 2015
| Pa. | Sep 28, 2016

Background

  • After a decedent's death, Pennsylvania law permits two post-mortem causes of action: a wrongful death action (statutory claim for heirs) and a survival action (claim belonging to the decedent's estate).
  • 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301 (Wrongful Death Act) requires that any prior actions for the same injuries be consolidated with the wrongful death claim to avoid duplicate recovery; Pa.R.C.P. 213(e) implements this by mandating consolidation of wrongful death and survival actions.
  • Plaintiffs (co-executors and wrongful death heirs) proceeded in state court; defendants sought arbitration of the survival claim under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
  • The Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority held the FAA preempted Rule 213(e) such that the survival claim could proceed to arbitration separate from the wrongful death claim.
  • Justice Donohue dissented, arguing FAA preemption cannot strip heirs of their legislatively created wrongful death cause of action because severance would defeat the statutory consolidation requirement and risk duplicative recoveries.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the FAA preempts Pa.R.C.P. 213(e) and § 8301's consolidation requirement Rule 213(e)/§ 8301 are substantive statutory conditions; FAA cannot deprive heirs of their wrongful death cause of action FAA preempts state procedural rules that obstruct arbitration; survival claim must be severed and arbitrated Majority: FAA preempts Rule 213(e) as applied, allowing arbitration of survival claim; Dissent: FAA cannot override statutory right and consolidation requirement
Whether severing the survival claim unlawfully deprives heirs of property rights Severance defeats statutory joinder requirement and thus deprives heirs of their wrongful death remedy (property) without due process Arbitration of survival claim does not extinguish wrongful death claim; only resolves estate’s claim in arbitration Dissent: severance would unconstitutionally deprive heirs of a statutory property interest; majority disagrees
Whether Rule 213(e) is merely procedural or effectively substantive Rule 213(e) is substantive in effect because it enforces § 8301’s mandate to prevent duplicate recoveries Rule 213(e) is a procedural rule subject to FAA preemption when it obstructs arbitration Dissent: it's substantive and not preemptable; majority: preempted to the extent it defeats arbitration
If FAA preempts, whether court should nonetheless consolidate claims absent Rule 213(e) Even without the Rule, § 8301’s consolidation requirement remains and court should order joint judicial resolution FAA-supported arbitration of survival claim is permissible and does not require consolidation Dissent: consolidation should still be ordered on statutory grounds; majority permits arbitration of survival claim

Key Cases Cited

  • Tulewicz v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 606 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1992) (explains wrongful death and survival actions and consolidation requirement)
  • Pezzulli v. D’Ambrosia, 26 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1942) (directs consolidation and joint trial of wrongful death and survival actions to avoid duplicate recovery)
  • Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994) (distinguishes measurement of damages in wrongful death and survival claims)
  • Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (FAA preemption principles regarding state policies disfavoring arbitration)
  • Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (U.S. 1989) (state judicial-forum requirements can conflict with FAA)
  • Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1984) (FAA preempts certain state laws requiring judicial forums)
  • AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (U.S. 2011) (FAA preempts state unconscionability doctrine when it obstructs arbitration)
  • Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (U.S. 2008) (arbitration of statutory claims does not forfeit substantive statutory rights)
  • Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (U.S. 1958) (recognizes causes of action as property interests with due process protection)
  • Martinez v. State of Cal., 444 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1980) (acknowledges wrongful death statutory causes as species of property)
  • Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (U.S. 1982) (cause of action is property protected by Due Process Clause)
  • Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1988) (intangible causes of action are property under the Due Process Clause)
  • Frazier v. Oil Chem. Co., 179 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1962) (statutory right to sue is governed by the statute's conditions)
  • Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86 (Pa. 1867) (statutory remedies require compliance with statutory conditions)
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