Taylor v. Carter, 333 S.W.3d 437

Mayor Carter filed a petition for declaration of rights against the LaGrange City Council challenging: (a) approval and later rescission of Graham Whatley as City Attorney, (b) a tax-rate reduction that allegedly created a budget deficit, and (c) appointment of a nonelected city officer to the City Ethics Commission.
Council conditional-approvals and concerns included Whatley's withdrawal from a case and his renting property from the Mayor amid pending DUI charges; Whatley had not become official City Attorney when rescission occurred.
Ordinance 10-2008 reduced the real property tax rate from $0.22 to $0.20, which the trial court found lowered revenues below expenditures for the 2008-2009 fiscal year, creating a budget shortfall.
The trial court granted Mayor’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Whatley and voided the tax reduction, and denied the Council’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate.
Council appealed, arguing the budget was not required to be balanced at the moment of modification, that Whatley’s appointment could be rescinded before conditioning acts, and that the trial court should have recused itself; Mayor cross-appealed on the funds and balance issues.
This Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the tax reduction violated KRS 91A.030(8)/(10) and Kentucky Constitution §157, reversed on the Whatley-appointment issue, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the tax reduction violated budget balance requirements	Council argues no required balance at modification; surplus from donations/new growth offset.	Mayor contends the reduction caused a deficit and violated KRS 91A.030(8)-(10) and §157.	Tax reduction violated budget balance requirements; the ordinance was invalid.
Whether Whatley’s appointment was revocable before final approval	Council could rescind since conditional and not yet officially appointed.	Mayor contends appointment was executive and not rescindable by Council.	Council could rescind prior to official appointment; judgment on that issue reversed.
Whether the trial court should have recused itself	Judge’s comments showed bias and required recusal under KRS 26A.015.	Arguments were untimely and comments were factual history; no bias shown.	Recusal not warranted; issue waived and not reversible on this basis.

Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744 (Ky. 2006) (recusal standards and bias considerations)
Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1992) (recusal timing and appearance of impartiality)
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803) (concept of revocable to last act requirement (historical basis))
Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 32 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. App. 1930) (revocability of appointments prior to official action)
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. South East Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1992) (recusal and related procedures in Kentucky context)