Taylor v. Bayview Loan Servicing
195 N.E.3d 609
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- James and Katherine Taylor (pro se) filed an amended complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure and related torts against Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC based on conduct in an earlier foreclosure (No. 12 CH 16916).
- Bayview was substituted in as plaintiff in the foreclosure court by an order entered March 6, 2014; the Taylors contend they lacked notice of that proceeding.
- The foreclosure sale was confirmed on September 3, 2015, a judicial deed vested title in the purchaser, and a personal deficiency judgment was entered against Katherine; the Taylors also received an IRS Form 1099‑C in August 2015.
- Bayview moved to dismiss the Taylors’ post‑foreclosure suit under section 2‑619, arguing it was barred by section 15‑1509(c) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (vesting of title bars parties’ claims) and by res judicata.
- The Taylors argued the March 6, 2014 order (and all subsequent orders) was void due to fraud and lack of notice, so section 15‑1509(c) and res judicata could not bar their claims.
- The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice under section 2‑619(a)(9), holding section 15‑1509(c) barred the suit; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 15‑1509(c) bars the Taylors’ wrongful‑foreclosure suit after title vested by judicial deed | Taylors: No—judgment (March 6, 2014 order and later orders) is void for fraud/lack of notice, so the statutory bar does not apply | Bayview: Yes—title vested and §15‑1509(c) operates as an entire bar to claims by parties to the foreclosure | Held: §15‑1509(c) bars the suit; exception for void judgments does not apply because the foreclosure court had jurisdiction and any alleged fraud rendered the judgment voidable, not void |
| Whether alleged fraud in procuring the March 6, 2014 order renders the foreclosure judgment void and open to collateral attack | Taylors: The order was procured by fraud/extrinsic fraud and thus void, permitting collateral attack | Bayview: The court had personal and subject‑matter jurisdiction; alleged fraud does not make the judgment void | Held: Fraud after jurisdiction was acquired makes a judgment voidable, not void; collateral attack fails |
| Whether the Taylors were precluded by res judicata from relitigating the foreclosure issues | Taylors: Their challenge is not barred because the judgment is void | Bayview: Res judicata applies because parties and cause overlap and issues were previously litigated | Held: Court resolved appeal on §15‑1509(c) grounds and did not reach res judicata, but noted Taylors had previously litigated standing issues unsuccessfully |
| Whether pro se status excuses noncompliance with appellate briefing rules or deficient presentation of issues | Taylors: (implicitly) pro se status should be treated leniently | Bayview: Failures to follow rules justify forfeiture of arguments | Held: Pro se litigants remain bound by appellate rules; court considered sufficiently presented issues and forfeited only inadequately presented points |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149 (1993) (distinguishes void vs. voidable judgments; jurisdictional absence renders a judgment void)
- Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108 (1979) (civil judgments may be collaterally attacked as void only for total want of jurisdiction)
- In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169 (1998) (errors by a court with jurisdiction render judgments voidable, not void)
- Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159 (1983) (fraud occurring after jurisdiction is acquired renders judgment voidable, not void)
- In re M.B., 235 Ill. App. 3d 352 (1992) (explains fraud that affects jurisdiction vs. fraud after acquisition of jurisdiction; only the former can render a judgment void)