Taylor v. Barkes
135 S. Ct. 2042
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- Christopher Barkes, with a documented history of mental illness and prior suicide attempts, was arrested and admitted to a Delaware correctional facility in November 2004. A contractor-employed nurse performed intake screening.
- The intake used a 1997 NCCHC-based screening form listing 17 risk factors; the nurse recorded only two risk factors and categorized Barkes as a routine mental-health referral (no special suicide precautions).
- Barkes was housed alone; he called his wife the night after intake saying he intended to kill himself; she did not notify the facility. The next morning he was found dead by suicide.
- Barkes’s survivors sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging supervisory Eighth Amendment liability against state officials (Taylor and Williams) for failing to supervise the medical contractor’s suicide-screening protocols.
- The Third Circuit denied qualified immunity, recognizing a claimed constitutional right to “proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols” and finding disputed facts about the contractor’s practices.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity because the asserted right was not clearly established in 2004.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether supervisory officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to ensure adequate suicide-screening/prevention protocols | Barkes’s survivors: inmates have a right to proper implementation of adequate suicide-prevention protocols; supervisors are liable for failing to oversee contractor practices | Taylor/Williams: they lacked actual knowledge of a specific risk and had no clear constitutional duty to ensure particular screening protocols; qualified immunity applies | Court: No clearly established right in 2004 to required implementation of specific suicide-prevention protocols; qualified immunity granted |
| Whether circuit precedent clearly established such a right | Respondents: Third Circuit precedent (Colburn decisions) put officials on notice to prevent suicide risk, implying screening duties | Petitioners: Colburn did not mandate screening protocols or impose supervisory duties to adopt specific procedures; Farmer requires actual, not constructive, knowledge | Court: Colburn did not clearly establish a duty to implement particular screening measures; Farmer controls actual-awareness standard |
| Whether persuasive authority from other circuits established the right | Respondents: argued broader Eighth Amendment medical-care/suicide-prevention obligations | Petitioners: other circuits generally rejected an absolute right to correct suicide screening, undermining a clearly established rule | Court: Weight of other circuits indicated no clear constitutional right to correct screening; thus law was not beyond debate |
| Whether factual disputes about the contractor’s compliance defeat qualified immunity | Respondents: disputes over contractor practices make summary judgment inappropriate | Petitioners: even assuming deficiencies, absence of clearly established law means officials are immune | Court: Even accepting alleged deficiencies, absence of clearly established law entitles officials to qualified immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge of substantial risk)
- Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988) (discusses liability where officials know an inmate’s suicide vulnerability)
- Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991) (reiterates liability for officials aware of a particular suicide risk; did not prescribe screening protocols)
- Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001) (refuses to treat correct suicide screening as a constitutional right)
- Tittle v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535 (11th Cir. 1994) (weaknesses in screening/training/supervision did not demonstrate deliberate indifference)
- Burns v. Galveston County, 905 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejects absolute right to psychological screening as part of medical care)
- Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990) (general right to medical care does not require screening every detainee for suicide risk)