660 S.W.3d 525
Tex.2023Background
- Jack and Erin Skufca signed a purchase agreement for a new home containing a broad arbitration clause covering any dispute arising from the agreement or the property.
- Less than a year after moving in, the home allegedly developed mold that caused continuous illness to the Skufca children.
- In 2019 the Skufcas sued Taylor Woodrow/Taylor Morrison for multiple claims (breach of contract, negligent construction, fraud, implied warranties, RCLA, quantum meruit, DTPA); the petition named Mr. and Mrs. Skufca individually and Mrs. Skufca as next friend of the two minors.
- The petition did not distinguish which plaintiffs asserted which causes of action; the breach-of-contract count referred generally to “Plaintiffs” without limiting that term to the parents.
- The trial court denied Taylor Morrison’s motion to compel arbitration as to the children; the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.
- The Supreme Court held the children joined the parents’ breach-of-contract claim and, under direct-benefits estoppel, must arbitrate claims falling within the arbitration clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the minors joined the parents’ breach-of-contract claim such that they can be compelled to arbitrate | Skufca: the petition focuses children’s allegations on tort/personal-injury and the children lack legal basis to sue on the contract, so they did not join the contract claim | Taylor Morrison: petition uses “Plaintiffs” uniformly and does not distinguish claims, so minors joined breach-of-contract and are bound by arbitration clause | The petition unambiguously shows the children joined the breach-of-contract claim; direct-benefits estoppel compels arbitration |
| Whether direct-benefits estoppel applies to nonsignatory minors who seek relief tied to the parents’ contract | Skufca: minors did not contract and so are not bound by arbitration | Taylor Morrison: nonsignatories who sue based on a contract or seek its benefits may be estopped from avoiding arbitration | Held: a litigant who sues based on a contract is subject to its terms; the minors sued on contract-based allegations and are estopped from avoiding arbitration |
Key Cases Cited
- In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) (a party who sues based on a contract submits to the contract’s terms, including arbitration)
- In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005) (direct-benefits estoppel can require nonsignatories to arbitrate when they seek benefits from a contract)
- Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973) (minors’ contracts generally voidable; minors cannot accept benefits and repudiate obligations)
- Johnson v. Newberry, 267 S.W. 476 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1924) (contracts for necessaries may create liability for minors)
- Taylor Morrison of Tex., Inc. v. Skufca, 650 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (court of appeals decision below rejecting arbitration as to children)
