Taylor Engineering, Inc. and Robert J. Wagner, P.E. v. Dickerson Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation
221 So. 3d 719
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Taylor Engineering & Robert Wagner filed a post-trial motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under Fla. Stat. § 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 after a judgment of no liability.
- The trial court denied fees, relying on this Court’s prior decision in Borden Dairy (holding strict compliance with rule 1.442(c)(2) was required).
- While the appeal was pending, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the First DCA’s Borden Dairy decision in Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy, altering the strict-compliance rule.
- Dickerson (defendant) conceded the trial court erred under Kuhajda as to the rule‑content issue but argued Taylor’s settlement offer was a nominal offer not made in good faith, so fees should still be disallowed under § 768.79(7)(a).
- The panel reviewed conflicting First DCA language about the standard for whether a nominal offer is in good faith and settled on the minimal/nominal-exposure standard: a nominal offer is in good faith when the offeror reasonably believed its exposure to liability was minimal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor’s proposal for settlement was invalid for failure to strictly comply with rule 1.442(c)(2). | Taylor: Kuhajda controls; strict-content invalidation was erroneous. | Dickerson: originally relied on Borden Dairy to uphold denial. | The trial court erred under Kuhajda; remand to reconsider fees in light of Kuhajda. |
| Whether a nominal offer was made in good faith (discretion to deny fees under § 768.79(7)(a)). | Taylor: its offer was made in good faith because it reasonably believed exposure was minimal. | Dickerson: the offer was nominal and not made in good faith, so fees should be disallowed. | Court clarified controlling standard: good faith exists where offeror had a reasonable basis to believe its exposure was nominal/minimal; remand for trial court to apply that standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama, LLC v. Kuhajda, 171 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (prior First DCA rule requiring strict compliance with rule 1.442(c)(2))
- Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama, LLC, 202 So. 3d 391 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court quashed Borden Dairy and limited strict-content invalidation)
- Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Acosta, Inc., 58 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (articulated reasonable‑basis/minimal‑exposure standard for nominal offers)
- Gen. Mech. Corp. v. Williams, 103 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (discussed third‑district language suggesting a no‑exposure test)
- Event Servs. Am., Inc. v. Ragusa, 917 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (discussed record showing no exposure language but read alongside other Third DCA cases)
- Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. Acme Gas Corp., 689 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (source of language suggesting no‑exposure formulation)