Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp.
47 A.3d 1190
| Pa. | 2012Background
- Camelback Ski Corporation operates a ski resort with family and common snow-tubing slopes and requires waivers pre-signing releases.
- Tayar signed the Release before using Camelback’s family tubing slopes and was subsequently injured by a collision with another tuber.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, holding the Release barred Tayar’s claims, including Monaghan’s acts, and concluded the release did not cover recklessness.
- The en banc Superior Court reversed, holding the Release did not cover Monaghan and that it released only negligent conduct, leaving factual questions about recklessness.
- This Court granted review to decide (1) whether employees are covered by a release naming only the employer, (2) whether recklessness can be released, and (3) what language is needed to release recklessness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the release cover Camelback employees? | Tayar: release mentions Camelback only; employees are not described and not covered. | Camelback: corporation acts through its employees; language sufficiently covers employees. | Yes; the release encompassed Camelback's employees, including Monaghan. |
| Is it against public policy to release recklessness in a pre-injury exculpatory clause? | Tayar: public policy bars releases of reckless conduct; relying on cases and Restatement §195(1). | Camelback: such releases may be enforceable; distinctions exist for recreational contexts. | Yes; there is a dominant public policy against releasing reckless conduct. |
| If a release of recklessness is barred, what standard governs enforceability of exculpatory clauses? | Tayar: language must meet strict Topp Copy criteria; must specify releases of employees for recklessness. | Valeo and others show broader language can cover recklessness; focus on language specificity. | Public policy controls; recklessness cannot be released, regardless of broad phrasing; Topp Copy criteria apply to enforceability but not to upend public policy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Topp Copy Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 533 Pa. 468 (Pa. 1993) (strict construction; greatest particularity; language against protegee; burden on proponent)
- Valeo v. Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc., 347 Pa. Super. 230 (Pa. Super. 1985) (release limited to gross negligence; public policy considerations discussed)
- Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174 (Pa. 2010) (recreational activities; none of the cases applicable to recklessness control public policy)
- Zimmer v. Mitchell and Ness, 253 Pa. Super. 474 (Pa. Super. 1978) (specific language describing harms; release may bar claims when precise)
- L. Luria & Son, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 460 So.2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (gross negligence; exculpatory clauses and public policy considerations)
- Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314 (Conn. 2005) (release of recklessness not enforced; public policy concerns)