TAWANA SCOTT VS. TREETOP DEVELOPMENT, LLC (L-9086-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-5256-17T1

Background

Plaintiff Tawana Scott sued property owner/managing entities after slipping on snow/ice, injuring her ankle.
Defendants filed a dispositive summary-judgment motion electronically but did not serve plaintiff or her counsel with the motion papers.
The trial court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor; plaintiff was served with the resulting order by mail on April 5, 2018.
Plaintiff filed a motion (May 23, 2018) to vacate the summary-judgment order, asserting she never received the motion papers and therefore had no opportunity to oppose; she relied on Rule 4:50-1 grounds among others.
The trial court denied the vacatur as untimely under Rule 4:49-2, concluding plaintiff should have acted after service of the order and could not relax the rule's time limits.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding the trial court misapplied the rules, and that defective service of a dispositive motion justified vacatur under Rule 4:50-1 subsections (d) and (f); the summary-judgment order was vacated and the matter remanded (without addressing the motion's merits).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff's motion to vacate must be judged under R. 4:49-2 (timely reconsideration) or R. 4:50-1 (relief from judgment)	Scott argued her motion relied on facts learned after judgment (defendants never served the motion) and thus R. 4:50-1 applies	Defendants argued plaintiff’s motion was untimely and should be dismissed under 4:49-2; service of the order triggered the time to move	Court held the judge misapplied the law: R. 4:50-1 governs when relief is sought due to post-judgment defects like lack of service, so the motion should have been considered under 4:50-1 rather than 4:49-2
Whether defective service of a dispositive motion warrants vacatur under R. 4:50-1(d) (void)	Scott argued lack of service amounted to defective process making the judgment void	Defendants contended service of the order controlled the timing and cured any procedural lapse	Court held defective service that deprived Scott of notice implicated Rule 4:50-1(d) (judgment void) and due process, warranting vacatur
Whether defective service establishes extraordinary circumstances under R. 4:50-1(f)	Scott argued denial to oppose a dispositive motion is an extraordinary circumstance implicating equity and due process	Defendants argued plaintiff waited too long and invoked 4:50-1 to evade 4:49-2 limits	Court held denial of opportunity to be heard on a dispositive motion was an extraordinary circumstance under (f), justifying relief
Whether plaintiff’s motion was untimely under the rules (procedural prejudice)	Scott noted she moved promptly after learning she had not been served; Rule 4:50-2 governed service of the vacatur motion	Defendants emphasized the 20-day reconsideration limit and that plaintiff had almost six weeks after receiving the order	Court found the vacatur motion was timely under Rule 4:50-2 and that timing rules did not bar relief given the defective service and due-process concerns

Key Cases Cited

Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 (1984) (distinguishes use of Rule 4:50 to avoid Rule 4:49 time limits; explains proper scope of 4:50)
In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440 (2002) (Rule 4:50 focuses on post-judgment events making enforcement unjust)
US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449 (2012) (standard of review for trial court decisions on Rule 4:50 motions)
M & D Assocs. v. Mandara, 366 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 2004) (defective service can render a judgment void)
Sobel v. Long Island Entertainment Prods., Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 285 (App. Div. 2000) (vacatur/remand where moving party failed to comply with service requirements)
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Sparta Twp. v. Service Elec. Cable Television, 198 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 1985) (due process requires opportunity to be heard; court should dismiss or postpone decision if opposing party not served)
Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334 (1966) (equity and due-process principles guide relief from judgments)