623 F.Supp.3d 365
S.D.N.Y.2022Background:
- Plaintiff Victoriano Tavarez is legally blind and uses screen‑reading software; he alleges he attempted to browse and transact on www.moochocolates.com between June 2021 and June 2022 but encountered accessibility barriers (e.g., screen reader failures with pop‑ups and product images).
- Tavarez sued Moo Organic Chocolates under Title III of the ADA and related city law provisions, alleging the website is inaccessible to visually impaired users.
- Moo Chocolates moved to dismiss, arguing a stand‑alone website is not a "place of public accommodation" under Title III unless tethered to a physical, brick‑and‑mortar location.
- The Court found the phrase "place of public accommodation" ambiguous, concluded statutory text and legislative history support treating public‑facing websites as covered places of public accommodation, and denied the motion to dismiss on that ground.
- The Court denied Moo Chocolates’ late request to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
- The Court sua sponte identified likely pleading deficiencies on Article III standing (insufficient facts to plausibly show intent to return) and ordered Tavarez to amend or show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of standing.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a public‑facing website is a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA | Tavarez: ADA covers websites; inaccessible website denies equal access to goods/services | Moo Chocolates: ADA covers only physical places or sites with a nexus to a physical location | Court: Websites are places of public accommodation even without a physical nexus; motion to dismiss denied |
| Interpretation of statutory text and scope of Title III | Tavarez: ADA's broad purpose and inclusion of non‑physical "services" supports coverage of websites | Moo Chocolates: Silence about websites implies exclusion; Congress intended physical locations | Court: Text is ambiguous; surrounding language and purpose (including services not tied to structures) and legislative history support inclusion of websites |
| Request for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) | Tavarez: (opposed implicitly) | Moo Chocolates: Seeks §1292(b) certification if motion denied | Court: Denied—request raised for first time in reply and not properly presented |
| Article III standing to seek injunctive relief | Tavarez: Alleges past injury and intent to purchase once barriers removed | Moo Chocolates: did not challenge standing, but Court must address jurisdiction | Court: Tavarez likely failed to plead plausible intent to return; ordered leave to amend or show cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999) (Title III applies to insurance goods and services beyond mere physical facility access)
- Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013) (standing test for ADA injunctive relief: past injury, likelihood of future discrimination, intent to return)
- Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 36 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2022) (clarifies requirement of a real and immediate threat of future injury for standing)
- Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2002) (statutory context and interpretation principles)