Tavarez v. Larkin
814 F.3d 644
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Tavarez killed his girlfriend in 2005 and was charged with second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession.
- He was tried in New York Supreme Court; the jury convicted him of first-degree manslaughter and weapon possession while acquitting murder.
- The verdict was clarified when the jury re-answered the weapon count after being reminded to complete the verdict form; ultimately, the jury found the weapon count guilty.
- In 2007 Tavarez was sentenced to concurrent 15-year terms on manslaughter and weapon convictions, plus a $250 surcharge.
- On direct appeal Tavarez argued a due process/double jeopardy issue based on the jury’s adjustment of the verdict; the Appellate Division rejected the claim and did not rule on ineffective assistance.
- Tavarez pursued state post-conviction relief asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the verdict procedure; the state court found the claim procedurally barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state court rejection of IAC claim was unreasonable under Strickland | Tavarez (IAC) argues prejudice existed via collateral consequences | Brown argues no prejudice given concurrent sentences and absence of controlling precedent | No; state court reasonably concluded no Strickland prejudice |
| Whether IAC can serve as cause to excuse procedural default | Tavarez argues IAC can excuse default and reach merits | Brown argues AEDPA deferential review applies to merits and default | Court need not decide standard here, but claims fail on merits even if cause is allowed |
| Whether recall of jurors and potential coercion/double jeopardy violated due process | Tavarez argued the judge’s actions conveyed message that verdict was wrong | Brown contends no coercion or double jeopardy; no due process violation | State court’s determination was reasonable; no due process violation or double jeopardy |
Key Cases Cited
- Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (U.S. 1985) (collateral consequences may inform prejudice but not controlling AEDPA standard)
- Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (collateral consequences can establish Strickland prejudice in some contexts)
- Lynch v. Dolce, 789 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2015) (AEDPA review framework for state-court decisions)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (reasonable-application standard for unreasoned state decisions)
- Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (U.S. 2001) (ineffective assistance can serve as cause to excuse procedural default)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (cause-and-prejudice standard for defaulted claims)
- Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006) (presumption about state appellate rejection of IAC on merits)
- United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1989) (judge may order redeliberation when verdict appears uncertain)
- United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1979) (judge’s authority to resolve ambiguity in jury verdict)
- United States v. Gaton, 98 F. App’x 61 (2d Cir. 2004) (AEDPA review of ambiguous verdict contexts)
- United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (concurrent sentences do not moot challenges to one sentence)
