497 P.3d 431
Wash. Ct. App.2021Background
- Tatyana Mason, a Ukrainian-born former spouse of John Mason, alleged domestic abuse and lost certain parental rights after 2011 family-law modification that found her abusive; the modification also imputed income to her and reduced her parental time.
- She claims the family proceedings (and counsel Laurie Robertson’s conduct) damaged her immigration status (conditional permanent resident), leading to USCIS denial of naturalization (May 5, 2014) and other lasting harms.
- Tatyana filed a 2017 pro se tort suit against John and Robertson asserting abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and related claims; she attached numerous exhibits from the family-law record.
- Robertson and John moved to dismiss (alternatively for summary judgment); the trial court considered extra-pleading materials, dismissed Tatyana’s claims, and awarded sanctions to both defendants under CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals held the trial court should have applied the summary judgment standard, ruled the statute of limitations, res judicata, and collateral estoppel did not bar Tatyana’s claims, found the court abused its discretion by not determining Tatyana’s need for an interpreter, and held litigation privilege does not automatically bar abuse of process or IIED where defendants allegedly pursued litigation for an extrinsic improper purpose; the court reversed dismissals and sanctions and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of review for motions labeled CR 12(b)(6) but relying on outside materials | Mason: trial court should apply CR 12(b)(6) de novo | John/Robertson: motions were properly treated as dismissals | Court: motions were in effect summary judgment motions because the court considered extra-pleading materials; apply summary judgment standard |
| Right to court-appointed interpreter in civil proceedings | Mason: lacked adequate interpreter access in prior family proceedings and in the dismissal hearings | Defendants: did not contest interpreter claim | Court: statutory right under ch. 2.43 RCW; trial court abused discretion by failing to inquire into Mason’s need before dispositive hearings; must evaluate on remand |
| Statute of limitations for tort claims arising from family proceedings | Mason: accrued no earlier than May 5, 2014 USCIS denial; lawsuit timely filed March 13, 2017 | Defendants: claims accrued in 2011–2013 so SOL expired | Court: discovery rule applies; earliest accrual was May 5, 2014 at the latest; claims filed within three years and are not time-barred |
| Res judicata and collateral estoppel | Mason: tort claims distinct from family-law remedies; not precluded | Defendants: prior family proceedings and sanctions foreclose these torts | Court: collateral estoppel not met because issues were not identical or actually litigated; res judicata inapplicable because cause of action and rights differ |
| Litigation privilege (absolute immunity) as a bar to abuse of process claims against an attorney | Mason: litigation privilege does not always shield attorneys who use process for extrinsic ends | Robertson: absolute immunity for statements and acts related to litigation unless attorney ceased acting as counsel | Court: litigation privilege does not automatically bar abuse of process claims; attorneys can be liable where they intentionally use process for an end unrelated to legitimate litigation purposes |
| Litigation privilege as a bar to IIED claims against attorney or party | Mason: IIED may survive where litigation was used to intentionally inflict severe harm | Defendants: statements and litigation conduct are privileged; only sanctions or perjury prosecutions available | Court: privilege may not shield conduct alleged to be undertaken for an extrinsic improper purpose; IIED claims survive if conduct was outside legitimate litigation scope |
| Summary judgment on abuse of process and IIED against John | Mason: evidence raises genuine disputes that John used modification proceedings to damage her immigration and finances, and to control her | John: claims fail because use of process was within litigation purpose and stress of litigation is not actionable | Court: genuine issues of material fact exist on both abuse of process and IIED claims; summary judgment was erroneous |
| Sanctions under CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185 | Mason: claims were factually and legally grounded | Defendants: claims frivolous, barred by immunity and SOL | Court: sanction awards were abuse of discretion given errors in dismissals and that Mason’s claims were not patently without any chance of success |
Key Cases Cited
- FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954 (2014) (standard for CR 12(b)(6) dismissal and accepting facts in complaint)
- Worthington v. Westnet, 182 Wn.2d 500 (2015) (treating a CR 12(b)(6) motion as summary judgment when the court considers matters outside the pleadings)
- Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wn.2d 59 (2007) (summary judgment burden shifting and proof requirements)
- Cuesta v. State Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 200 Wn. App. 560 (2017) (trial court duty to inquire into need for interpreter when lack of English fluency is put on notice)
- Killian v. Seattle Pub. Schs., 189 Wn.2d 447 (2017) (discovery rule governs accrual for statute of limitations)
- McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265 (1980) (litigation privilege shields statements made in judicial proceedings when pertinent to relief sought)
- Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng’rs, Inc., 113 Wn.2d 123 (1989) (broad application of litigation privilege to protect witnesses and participants)
- Fite v. Lee, 11 Wn. App. 21 (1974) (attorney may be liable for abuse of process when acting outside scope of agency or using process for extrinsic improper ends)
- Batten v. Abrams, 28 Wn. App. 737 (1981) (abuse of process defined as using process to accomplish an end outside its regular purview)
- Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wn.2d 192 (2003) (elements and extreme conduct standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Hough v. Stockbridge, 152 Wn. App. 328 (2009) (abuse of process elements and examples of impermissible uses of process)
- Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wn.2d 582 (1983) (absolute privilege requires compelling public policy justification)