Tatum v. Arizona
137 S. Ct. 11
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Five Arizona petitioners (Tatum, Purcell, Najar, Arias, DeShaw) were sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for crimes committed as juveniles.
- Each case was decided after Miller v. Alabama but before or around Montgomery v. Louisiana; sentencing courts noted age as a mitigating factor but did not expressly determine whether the juvenile was among the "rare" offenders for whom LWOP could be proportional.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated matters, vacated the Arizona judgments, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Montgomery.
- Justice Sotomayor concurred in the GVR, emphasizing that Miller and Montgomery require sentencers to decide whether a juvenile’s crime reflects transient immaturity or irreparable corruption, not merely to note age.
- Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented from the GVR, arguing Arizona courts had already considered Miller, that Montgomery’s retroactivity does not affect these post-Miller decisions, and that the record supports LWOP in these cases.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Montgomery requires vacatur/remand of post-Miller juvenile LWOP sentences | Petitioners: Montgomery’s holding (that Miller announced a substantive rule) requires lower courts to reexamine whether LWOP was imposed only on the very rare, irreparably corrupt juvenile | Arizona: These sentences were imposed after consideration of youth under Miller; Montgomery’s retroactivity ruling does not change those post-Miller outcomes | Court: GVR — judgments vacated and remanded so lower courts can reconsider sentences in light of Montgomery’s substantive rule |
| What Miller/Montgomery require a sentencer to decide | Petitioners: Sentencer must determine whether offender’s crime reflects transient immaturity or permanent incorrigibility | State: Mere consideration of age and related mitigation satisfies Miller; records here support LWOP | Court (per Sotomayor): More than noting age is required — sentencer must analyze whether offender is among the rare irreparably corrupt juveniles |
| Whether a simple acknowledgment of age as mitigating is sufficient | Petitioners: Insufficient; appearance of consideration is not the same as the required individualized determination | State: Judges expressly considered age and mitigation; that suffices | Court: Sentencers must perform a meaningful inquiry into youth-related characteristics and prospects for rehabilitation before LWOP is imposed |
| Appropriateness of using GVR here | Petitioners: GVR permits prompt remand to apply Montgomery’s substantive rule | Dissent: GVR is improper because lower courts already applied Miller; this is a do-over without justification | Court: Granted, vacated, and remanded to permit lower courts to reassess under Montgomery |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; courts must account for juveniles’ diminished culpability)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule; life-without-parole may be proportionate only for the rare juvenile whose crime reflects permanent incorrigibility)