Tash v. Roden, 626 F.3d 15

In 2002, Tash was convicted of rape of a mentally impaired adult in a Massachusetts facility based largely on his confession.
The victim could not testify; the Commonwealth relied on Brown’s eyewitness account, Macey’s police interview, and a psychologist’s assessment.
Brown observed Tash with the victim naked from the waist down, unbuckled belt, and the victim’s legs raised during what she believed to be diaper changes.
Tash admitted during police questioning to two sexual encounters with the victim; he claimed his confession was misrepresented by the officer who recorded it.
Massachusetts law defined rape as intercourse by force or threat with no consent; applicable to a victim incapable of consenting, making penetration the key element.
Tash exhausted state remedies, then sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied with a COA on all issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether corroboration of the confession was required under state law and federal habeas review	Tash: confession must be corroborated.	Commonwealth: corroboration not constitutionally required; any corroboration suffices if it fortifies the confession.	Corroboration not constitutionally required; substantial corroboration existed and sufficed.
Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, suffices to convict under Jackson v. Virginia	Tash: evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.	Commonwealth: Brown’s testimony plus the confession adequately prove the crime.	Jackson claim fails; substantial evidence supports the conviction.
Whether trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland	Tash: counsel erred by not using a psychologist and by cross-examining inconsistencies more aggressively.	Commonwealth: counsel acted reasonably; strategic choices supported by record.	No ineffective-assistance violation; trial strategy reasonable.

Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954) (corroboration historically encouraged but not constitutionally mandated)
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954) (corroboration viewed as prudent, not mandatory)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (habeas review limited to federal constitutional violations)
Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453 (1984) (Massachusetts corroboration standard)
United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 1994) (acknowledges corroboration doctrine in federal trials)
United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (corroboration not strictly required if confessor’s testimony is credible)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (sufficiency standard: rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2001) (Jackson claims not exhausted if not properly raised below)
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (Strickland standard and deference to trial counsel decisions)
Ruiz v. United States, 339 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2003) (non-constitutional evidentiary considerations in assessing trial strategy)
Clarke v. Spencer, 582 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2009) (deferential review of state-court determinations)
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722 (2001) (Massachusetts approach to consent and rape definitions)
Commonwealth v. Costello, 411 Mass. 371 (1991) (standard of review for corroborating evidence in Massachusetts)