547 S.W.3d 689
Ark.2018Background
- Richard Tarver was convicted of capital murder and related offenses for the 2015 murder of 90-year-old Lavinda Counce and sentenced to life without parole plus consecutive terms.
- Police identified Tarver via a neighborhood canvass, executed a search warrant at his home, and recovered a defaced firearm at the location Tarver later identified. DNA and witness evidence linked Tarver to a black bag found at the victim’s home.
- Three sets of custodial statements were at issue: (1) an on-scene remark during the search (“I know, I know”), (2) statements while handcuffed in police vehicles (denial, admission of disposing of the body, location of the gun) and (3) two recorded, signed confessions at the sheriff’s office describing the killing.
- Tarver moved to suppress the statements and sought directed verdicts based on alleged insufficiency of evidence without his statements; trial court denied suppression and the directed- verdict motions.
- On appeal Tarver challenged sufficiency of the evidence (primarily arguing statements were coerced and uncorroborated) and raised 26 additional trial-court rulings (many abandoned or moot, including death-penalty-related points).
- The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the record for reversible error, affirmed admission of the statements, found independent corroborating evidence sufficient, and affirmed all convictions and sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Tarver's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of on-scene statement (“I know, I know”) | It was custodial and elicited by officers; should be suppressed as coerced | It was a spontaneous utterance, not the product of interrogation, thus admissible | Court: admission proper (spontaneous); concurrence disagreed but found harmless under Elstad doctrine |
| Admissibility of vehicle statements (unrecorded; no signed form) | Fruit of poisonous tree from first statement; lack of signed form/recording renders statements involuntary | Prior statement was admissible; lack of signature/recording not dispositive; waiver can be shown otherwise | Court: admissible; no poisonous tree and procedural defects alone insufficient to exclude |
| Admissibility of recorded stationhouse confessions | Should be excluded as tainted by earlier statements | Statements were voluntary and not fruit of an illegal interrogation; later confessions sufficiently attenuated | Court: admissible; no independent reason to suppress and corroboration exists |
| Sufficiency of evidence for convictions (esp. premeditation for capital murder) | Without his statements evidence was insufficient to prove elements like premeditation | Other evidence (transport to cornfield, bringing weapon, execution-style killing, physical evidence) corroborated confessions and supported premeditation | Court: substantial evidence supports convictions; affirm directed-verdict denials |
| Admission of photos and other evidentiary rulings | Some photos were duplicative and inflammatory | Trial court limited photos to 13 distinct exhibits, excluding many others | Court: no abuse of discretion in admitting selected photos |
| Jury-selection and fair-cross-section claims (including juror compensation) | Needed alternative selection/compensation to ensure paycheck-to-paycheck persons included | No factual showing of systematic exclusion; novel theory unsupported by authority | Court: claims unproven; no constitutional defect shown; denied |
| Other trial rulings (e.g., expert/fingerprint testimony, cross-exam about lack of remorse, severance) | Various objections to relevance, expertise, prejudice, and severance | State: rulings within trial court discretion; objections waived or unsupported | Court: no reversible error; rulings affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Stone v. State, 321 Ark. 46 (1995) (spontaneous statements not elicited by interrogation may be admissible)
- Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322 (1985) (police prompting can render a statement product of interrogation)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (exclusionary-rule analysis for statements obtained after illegal arrest/questioning)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (attenuation doctrine: subsequent voluntary confession may cure earlier Miranda violation)
- Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 514 (1990) (lack of signed rights form alone does not render waiver invalid)
- Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (defendant's right not to be compelled to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing)
- Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (standard for fair-cross-section jury claim)
- Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (discusses racial exclusion from jury venires)